Debris/Ice/TPS Assessment and Integrated Photographic Analysis for Shuttle Mission STS-49 by Katnik, Gregory N. et al.
NASA Technical Memorcndum TM 107547 ! 
(NASA-TM-107547) OEtRIS/ICE/TPS 	 N92-32454 
ASSESSMENT AND INTEGRATED 
PHOTOGRAP H IC ANALYSIS FOR SHUTTLE 
MISSION STS-49 (NASA)	 Unclas 
G3/16 0116468 
Debris/lce/TPS Assessment And 
Integrated Photographic Analysis For 
Shuttle Mission STS-49 
July 1992 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19920023210 2020-03-17T11:09:27+00:00Z
NASA Technical Memorandum TM 107547 
Debris/Ice/TPS Assessment And 
Integrated Photographic Analysis For 
Shuttle Mission STS-49 
Gregory N. Katnik 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center 
Scott A. Higginbotham 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center 
J. Bradley Davis 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center 
July 1992 
P
	
	
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration
DEBRIS/ICE/TPS ASSESSMENT 
AND 
INTEGRATED PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS

OF
SHUTTLE MISSION STS-49 
May 7, 1992 
Prepared By: 
;/,40* 9- h'4 
Scott A. Hiinbotham 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center 
TV-MSD--22
0- -1-^ . , I C' ^) 
J.1 Bradley] Davis 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center 
TV-MSD-22 
Approved: 
Grery* Katnik 
Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Analysis 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center 
TV-MSD- 22
Pedro J. Rosado 
Chief, ET Mechanical Sys 
NASA/Kennedy Space Center 
TV-MSD-22
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1.0 Summary	 • 2 
2.0 KSC Ice/Debris/Photo Team Activities . . 6 
3.0 Flight Readiness Firing (FRF)	 ..... 11 
3.1 Pre-Firing SSV/Pad Debris Inspection . 11 
3.2 FRF Ice/Frost Inspection ......... 17 
3.3 Post Drain Inspection 	 ......... 29 
4.0 Pre-Launch Briefing 	 .......... 35 
4.1 Pre-Launch SSV/Pad Debris Inspection . . 36 
5.0 Launch	 .................. 42 
5.1 Ice/Frost Inspection 	 .......... 42 
5.2 Orbiter	 ................. 42 
5.3 Solid Rocket Boosters
	 ......... 42 
5.4 External	 Tank	 .............. 45 
5.5 Facility	 ................ 49 
6.0 Post Launch Pad Debris Inspection
	 .	 . . 60 
7.0 KSC Film Review and Problem Reports
	 . 65 
7.1 FRF Film and Video Summary ....... 65 
7.2 
'
Launch Film and Video Summary 	 ..... 70 
7.3 On-Orbit Film and Video Summary
	 .	 . . 74 
7.4 Landing Film and Video Summary ..... 74 
8.0 SRB Post Flight/Retrieval Assessment . 77 
8.1 RH SRB Debris Inspection ........ 77 
8.2 LH SRB Debris Inspection ........ 86 
8.3 Recovered SRB Disassembly Findings . 	 . 94 
9.0 Orbiter Post Landing Debris Assessment 95 
10.0 Debris Sample Lab Reports
	 ....... 120 
11.0 Post Launch Anomalies
	 ......... 124 
11.1 Launch Pad/Facility	 .......... 124 
11.2 External	 Tank	 ............. 124 
11.3 SolidRocket Boosters
	 ......... 124 
11.4 Orbiter	 ................ 124 
Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary . 125 
Appendix B. MSFC Photographic Analysis Summary. 158 
Appendix C. Rockwell Photo Analysis Summary .
	 . 176
1. 
FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to 
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational 
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine 
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance 
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility 
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and 
photographic analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, 
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying 
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addi-
tion to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video Analysis, 
reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight 
Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also included 
to provide an integrated assessment of each Shuttle mission. 
3.3.
Shuttle Mission STS-49 was launched at 7:40 p.m. local 5/7/92 
'''•!	 '"' 
COLOR PHCIOGRAPI-I
1.0 Siimtniry 
In addition to the Debris/Ice/TPS assessment, this report 
provides an integrated Photographic Analysis of Shuttle 
Mission STS-49 with contributions from KSC, JSC, MSFC, and 
Rockwell - Downey. 
The Flight Readiness Firing was conducted on 6 April 1992. 
From a debris standpoint, there were no major issues. During 
the Pre-Firing Inspection, a piece of rope was observed adher-
ing to the LH2 tank TPS below the GUCP and approximately 85 
feet above the MLP deck. Since the. rope was not a debris 
concern and does not affect TPS performance, it will not be 
removed before launch. The presence of the rope was accepted 
by MRB. 
The Ice Inspection revealed no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, 
or NSTS-08303 violations. A crack occurred in the intertank 
foam (-Y-Z quadrant) in the first stringer valley between the 
-Y thrust panel and the GUCP beginning at the LH2 tank-to-
intertank flange and propagating forward. The crack was 
approximately 18-20 inches in length, 1/4-inch wide with no 
offset, and was not filled with ice or frost. IPR 49V-0314 was 
upgraded to a PR and dispositioned to use-as-is based on 
experience with similar TPS cracks at this location. A suspect 
. crack 6 inches long was present in the -Y vertical strut cable 
tray forward facing surface at the tank acreage interface. A 
4-inch diameter ice/frost formation with venting (blowing) 
purge gas was present on the LH2 umbilical 17-inch flapper 
valve actuator access •port foam plug forward (top) corner. 
The ice and frost formations were acceptable for the test per 
NSTS-08303. MPS evaluated the venting/blowing purge gas and 
accepted the condition for the firing. 
The Post FRF Drain Inspection revealed the intertank TPS crack 
had closed during tank warm-up and was not visible. Disposi-
tion of the IPR accepted the current condition for launch 
since it is typical of structural flexure cracks previously 
observed and the area is outside the debris zone. A hands-on 
inspection of the L02 feedline support brackets revealed 
crushed/damaged BX-250, approximately 3.5"xl", on the outboard 
side of the XT-1129 attach point at the feedline surface. The 
damaged area was repaired with PDL foam. Some minor SLA damage 
occurred on the boomerang bracket. The Ice Team had reported 
the presence of a suspect 6-inch long crack on the forward 
face of the -Y vertical strut cable tray. The crack had closed 
during tank warm-up, but was still visible during the Drain 
Inspection. A stress relief cut in the TPS to allow for 
structural movement had been deleted by design on this tank at 
the factory. Since the surface is not cryogenic and sufficient 
foam remains for ascent aerothermal loads, the crack was 
accepted for launch. Tile surface coating material was missing 
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from a 10"x3" area on the body flap stub between SS #2 and 
#3 near the body flap hinge. Loss of this material was most 
likely caused by .SS ignition vibration and acoustics. 
The FRF Film/Video Analysis revealed a fore-and-aft movement 
(diaphram-like flexing) of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster during engine start-
up. The movement subsided as the SSME plume stabilized and the 
Mach diamonds formed. Measurements of this motion on the film 
analyzer showed the amplitude was 1.1 inches. Review of SSME
 
ignition films revealed a similar motion in the same time 
frame on the other Orbiters. Structures engineering performed 
an assessment of the condition and found no anomaly. 
The Pre-Launch Inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle was 
conducted on 6 May 1992. The detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 
398 and MLP-2 also included the primary flight elements OV-105 
Endeavour (1st flight), ET-43 (LWT 36), and B1050 SRB' s. There 
were no vehicle anomalies. Facility discrepancies were worked 
real-time or were entered into OMI S0007, Appendix K, for 
resolution prior to vehicle tanking. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 7 May 1992. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 viola-
tions. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the 
established data base. The previous TPS anomalies (crack in 
the intertank TPS, a piece of rope on the LH2 tank, and a 
6-inch TPS crack on the -Y vertical strut cable tray) had been 
accepted for launch. A 4-inch diameter ice/frost formation 
with venting (blowing) purge gas was present on the ET/ORB LH2 
umbilical 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam plug 
forward (top) corner. This TPS plug had been replaced after 
the Flight Readiness Firing. The ice/frost formation was 
acceptable for launch per NSTS-08303. MPS evaluated the 
venting/blowing purge gas and deemed the condition acceptable 
for launch. Six Ice/Frost Team observation/anomalies were 
documented and found acceptable for launch per the LCC and 
NSTS-08303. The LH2 umbilical leak sensors detected no 
significant hydrogen during the cryoload. The tygon tubing was 
successfully removed from the vehicle with no TPS contact or 
damage. 
A debris inspection of Pad 398 was performed after launch. The 
only flight hardware found were two FRSI plugs, a common 
occurrence, from the Orbiter base heat shield. Launch damage 
to the hoiddown posts was minimal. EPON shim material on the 
south hoiddown posts was intact, but debonded. There was no 
visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south 
holddown posts. No frangible nut/ordnance fragments were 
found. Damage to the facility overall was minimal. 
A total of 110 film and video items were analyzed as part of 
the post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost
	 if 
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the 
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mission. Film items E-76, 77, 19, 20 again showed a fore-and-
aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the centerline 
area between the SSME cluster during engine start-up. The 
movement subsided as the SSME plume stabilized and the Mach 
diamonds formed. Measurements of the motion on the film 
analyzer showed the amplitude was 1.1 inches. No stud hang-ups 
occurred on the SRB holddown posts and no ordnance debris fell 
from the HDP DCS/stud holes. 
Hand-held views of the External Tank after separation were not 
taken by the crew due to dark conditions. OV-105 was equipped 
to carry two umbilical cameras. No vehicle anomalies were 
visible during SEB separation. ET separation was not recorded 
by the umbilical cameras due to the dark conditions. Orbiter 
performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC), final 
approach, landing gear deployment, flare, and touchdown 
appeared normal. First use of the drag chute, which was 
deployed just after nose wheel touchdown, was nominal. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. Both frustums exhibited a below average total of 14 
debonds over fasteners. All Debris Containment System (DCS) 
plungers were seated properly with the exception of HDP #4, 
which was obstructed by frangible nut halves. This was the 
seventh flight utilizing the optimized link. None of the EPON 
shim material was lost during ascent. From a debris stand 
point, the recovered SRB's were in excellent condition. 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-105 was conducted on 
May-16-17, 1992, at Ames-Dryden (EAFB) on runway 22 and in the 
Mate/Demate Device (MDD). The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 
114 hits, of which 11 had a major dimension of one inch or 
greater. The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 55 hits, of 
which 6 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on 
these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous 
missions of similar configuration, the total number of Orbiter 
TPS debris hits was slightly less than average and the number 
of hits one inch or larger was much less than average. 
The most significant tile damage measured 9-5/8 x 2-5/8 x 1/4 
inches and was located on the right side of the vehicle just 
aft of the nosecap RCC. The size and depth of this damage site 
is indicative of an impact by a low density material such as 
External Tank TPS foam. The following items were found on the 
runway underneath the RH ET umbilical door: a piece of a Jo-
bolt, a spacer (washer), and a Torx head screw. Another Torx 
head screw was found on the runway underneath the LH ET 
umbilical door. This flight marked the first use of the 
Orbiter drag chute. According to JSC Deceleration System 
engineering, the drag chute functioned nominally. However, two 
tiles, one on the lower (-Z) edge of the drag chute opening 
and the other on the LH lower edge of the vertical stabilizer 
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"stinger", were damaged by the drag chute deployment. All drag 
chute hardware was recovered and showed no signs of abnormal 
operation. 
A variety of residuals present in the post-landing Orbiter 
samples originated from sources such as Orbiter TPS, SRB BSM 
exhaust residue, natural landing site products, organics, and 
paint. The samples obtained from Orbiter vent door #9 after 
landing revealed no conclusive source of the discoloration on 
the outer surface. The source of a similar phenomenon on a 
previous mission (STS-42) also could not be determined. These 
data do not indicate a single source of damaging or discolor-
ing debris as all of the other materials have been previously 
documented in post-landing samples reports. 
One Post Launch Debris Anomaly and no IFA candidates were 
observed during this mission assessment. 
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2.0KSC ICE/FROST/DEBRIS TEAM ACTIVITIES 
Team Composition: NASA KSC, NASA MSFC, NASA JSC, 
LSOC SPC, RI - DOWNEY, MMMSS - MAF, 
USBI - BPC, MTI - UTAH 
Team Activities: 
1) Prelaunch Pad Debris Inspection 
Objective: Identify and evaluate potential debris 
material/sources.	 Baseline debris and 
debris sources existing from previous 
launches. 
Areas: MLP deck, ORB and SRB flame exhaust 
holes, FSS, Shuttle external surfaces 
Time: L - lday 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.030 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall inspect 
the Shuttle and launch pad to identify 
and resolve potential debris sources. 
The prelaunch vehicle and pad 
configuration shall be documented and 
photographed. 
Documents: OMI S6444 
Report: Generate PR's and recommend corrective 
actions to pad managers. 
2) Launch Countdown Firing Room 2 
Objective: Evaluate ice/frost accumulation on the 
Shuttle and/or any observed debris 
utilizing OTV cameras. 
Areas: MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external 
surfaces 
Time: T - 6 hours to Launch + 1 hour or 
propellant drain 
Requirements: OSD SOOFBO.005 - Monitor and video 
tape record ET TPS surfaces during 
loading through prepressurization. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444 
Report: OIS call to NTD, Launch Director, and 
Shuttle managers. Generate IPR's.
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3) Ice/Frost TPS and Debris Inspection 
Objective: Evaluate any ice formation as 
potential debris material. Identify 
and evaluate any ORB, ET, or SRB TPS 
anomaly which may be a debris source 
or safety of flight concern. Identify 
and evaluate any other possible 
facility or vehicle anomaly. 
Areas: MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external 
surfaces 
Time: T - 3 hours (during 2 hour BIH) 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.020 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall inspect 
the Shuttle for ice/frost, TPS, and 
debris anomalies after cryo propellant 
loading.	 Evaluate, document, and 
photograph all anomalies. During the 
walkdown, inspect Orbiter aft engine 
compartment (externally) for water 
condensation arid/or ice formation in 
or between aft compartment tiles. An 
IR scan is required during the Shuttle 
inspection to verify ET surface temp-
eratures.	 During the walkdown inspect 
ET TPS areas which cannot be observed 
by the OTV system. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444 
Report: Briefing to NTD, Launch Director, 
Shuttle management; generate IPR's. 
4)	 Post Launch Pad Debris Inspection 
Objectives: Locate and identify debris that could 
have damaged the Shuttle during launch 
Areas: MLP zero level, flame exhaust holes 
and trenches, FSS, pad surfaces and 
slopes, extension of trenches to the 
perimeter fence, walkdown of the beach 
from Playalinda to Complex 40, aerial 
overview of inaccessible areas. 
Time: Launch + 1 hours (after pad safing, 
before washdown) 
Requirements: OSD S00U00.010 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
a post launch pad/area inspection to 
identify any lost flight or ground 
systems hardware and resultant debris 
sources. The post launch pad and area 
configuration shall be documented and 
photographed. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444
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Report:
	
	 Initial report to NTD and verbal 
briefing to Level II at L+8 hours; 
generate PR's. 
5) Launch Data Review 
Objective:
	
	 Detailed review of high speed films 
video tapes, and photographs from pad 
cameras, range trackers, aircraft and 
vehicle onboard cameras to determine 
possible launch damage to the flight 
vehicle. Identify debris and debris 
sources. 
Time:	 Launch + 1 day to Launch + 6 days 
Requirements: OMRSD S00tJ00.011 - An engineering film 
review and analysis shall be performed 
on all engineering launch film as soon 
as possible to identify any debris 
damage to the Shuttle. Identify flight 
flight vehicle or ground system damage 
that could affect orbiter flight 
operations or future SSV launches. 
Documents:	 OMI S6444 
Report:
	
	 Daily reports to Level II Mission 
Management Team starting on L+1 day 
through landing; generate PR's. 
6) SRB Post Flight/Retrieval Inspection 
Objective: Evaluate potential SRB debris sources. 
Data will be correlated with observed 
Orbiter post landing TPS damage. 
Areas: SP.B external surfaces (Hangar AF, 
CCAFS) 
Time: Launch + 24 hours (after on-dock, 
before hydrolasing) 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.013 - An engineering 
debris damage inspection team shall 
perform a post retrieval inspection 
of the SRB's to identify any damage 
caused by launch debris.
	 Anomalies 
must be documented/photographed and 
coordinated with the results of the 
post launch shuttle/pad area debris 
inspection. 
Documents: OMI B8001 
Report: Daily reports to Level II Mission 
Management Team. Preliminary report 
to SRB Disassembly Evaluation Team. 
Generate PR's.
8 
7) Orbiter Post Landing Debris Damage Assessment 
Objective: Identify and evaluate areas of Orbiter 
TPS damage due to debris and correlate 
if possible, source and time of 
occurrence. Additionally, runways are 
inspected for debris/sources of debris 
Areas: Orbiter TPS surfaces, runways 
Time: After vehicle safing on runway, before 
towing 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.040 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform a 
prelanding runway inspection to 
identify, document, and collect debris 
that could result in orbiter damage. 
Runway debris and any facility anomal-
ies which cannot be removed/corrected 
by the Team shall be documented and 
photographed; the proper management 
authority shall be notified and 
corrective actions-taken. 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.050 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
a post landing runway inspection to 
identify and resolve potential debris 
sources that may ,
 have caused vehicle 
damage but was not present or was not 
identified during pre-launch runway 
inspection. Obtain photographic 
documentation of any debris, debris 
sources, or flight hardware that may 
have been lost on landing. 
Requirements: OSD S00U00.060 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall map, 
document, and photograph debris-
related Orbiter TPS damage and debris 
sources. 
Requirements: OMRSD SOOUOO.012 - An engineering 
debris damage inspection team shall 
perform a post landing inspection of 
the orbiter vehicle to identify any 
damage-caused by launch debris. Any 
anomalies must be documented/ 
photographed and coordinated with the 
results of the post launch shuttle/ 
pad area debris inspection. 
Requirements: - OMRSD VO 9AJO . 095 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
temperature measurements of RCC nose 
cap and RCC RH wing leading edge 
panels 9 and 17. 
Documents: OMI S0026, OMI S0027, OMI S0028
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Report: Briefing to NASA Convoy Commander 
and generate PR's. Preliminary. 
report to Level II on the day of 
landing followed by a more detailed 
update the next day. 
8) Level II report 
Objective:	 Compile and correlate data from all 
inspections and analyses. Results 
of the debris assessment, along 
with recommendations for corrective 
actions, are presented directly to 
Level II via SIR and PRCB. Paper 
copy of complete report follows in 
3 to 4 weeks. (Ref NASA Technical 
Memorandum series)
3.0 FLIGHT READINESS FIRING (FEF) 
3.1 PEE-FIRING SSV/PP4D DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-FRF debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle was 
conducted on 5 April 1992 from 0800 - 0930 hours. The detailed 
walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-2 also included the primary 
flight elements OV-105 Endeavour (FRF/lst flight), ET-43 (LWT 
36), and BI-050 SRB's. Documentary photographs were taken of 
facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload/ 
launch, temporary hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and LD55 were 
installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical until a permanent sensor 
could be designed and installed. The tygon tubes are intended 
to remain in place during cryogenic loading and be removed by 
the Ice Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
There were no significant vehicle anomalies. A piece of rope 
was observed adhering to the LH2 tank TPS below the GUCP and 
approximately 85 feet above the Z'fi.P deck. Since the rope was 
not a debris concern and does not affect TPS performance, it 
will not be removed before launch. The presence of the rope was 
accepted by MRB. 
Several MLP deck access plate bolts had not been tightened. 
Loose debris, such as tie wraps, plastic bags, and retaining 
pins, lay on the MLP zero level. These discrepancies were 
corrected real-time by Pad Operations. Vacuuming, sweeping, and 
removing sand/small debris from the MLP deck, raised deck 
areas, and fence post holes was the only item entered in 30007, 
Appendix K.
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OV-105 Endeavour (1st flight), ET-43 (LWT 36), BI-050 SRBs 
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3.2 FRF ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 6 April 1992 from 0630 to 0800 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
The portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain surface temperature measure-
ments for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, as 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile anomalies were observed. The water spray boiler 
plugs were intact. Light frost was present at the SSME #1 
(2:00-9:00 o'clock) and #2 (full 360 degree circumference) heat 
shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The SS #3 heat shield was dry. 
An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on 
the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields. No GOX 
vapors originated from inside the SSME nozzles. No condensate 
was present on base heat shield tiles. 
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The STI 
portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH SRB case surface 
temperatures between 60 and 63 degrees F (Fahrenheit) . All 
measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum 
requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature 
(PT) supplied by MTI was 65 degrees F, which was within the 
required range of 44-86 degrees F. 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' predicted 
condensate with no ice/frost accumulation on the TPS acreage 
surfaces during cryoload. 
There was very light condensate but no ice/frost accumulation 
on the L02 tank ogive and barrel sections. There were no TPS 
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The pressuriza-
tion line and support ramps were in nominal configuration. The 
STI measured surface temperatures that ranged from 53 to 57 
degrees F.
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Figure 1. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
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Figure 2. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
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The intertank TPS acreage was dry. Very small frost spots were 
present in the -Y-Z quadrant stringer valleys at both LH2 and 
L02 tank-to-intertank flanges. No unusual vapors or ice/frost 
formations were present, on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The 
only TPS anomaly on the intertank consisted of a crack in the 
foam (-Y-Z quadrant) in the first stringer valley between the 
-Y thrust panel and the GUCP beginning at the intertank-to-LH2 
tank flange ,
 and propagating forward. The crack was approxi-
mately 18-20 inches in length, 1/4-inch wide with no offset, 
and was not filled with ice or frost. The portable STI measured 
surface temperatures that averaged 62 degrees F. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but no ice or frost., was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that ranged from 
51 to 59 degrees F. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, bipod jack pad 
closeouts, PAL ramp, cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps, 
longerons, thrust struts, manhole covers, or aft dome apex. 
Some ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper 
strut fairing expansion joints. A suspect crack 6 inches long 
appeared in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward facing 
surface at the tank acreage interface with possible ice/frost 
in the crack. Ice/frost covered the lower EB fittings outboard 
to the strut pin hole with condensate on the rest of the 
fitting. The struts were dry. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
There were no T'PS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of 
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge 
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and SSME firing. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with 
condensate. 
Isolated ice/frost formations were present on the outboard and 
top sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier. Ice/frost 
fingers 3-5 inches in length had formed on the pyro canister 
and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost had formed on the aft 
pyrotechnic canister bondline. Thin foam exists in this area 
due to an incorrect mold manufacture. The amount and location 
of the ice/frost was acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 
criteria. (The problem exists through end item EI-66. The mold 
will be changed to add more foam for EI-67 and subs). Normal 
venting of helium purge gas had occurred during tanking, stable 
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replenish, and SSME firing. There were no unusual vapors 
emanating from the umbilicals nor any evidence of cryogenic 
drips. A ring of frost had formed on the cable tray vent hole. 
A 4-inch diameter ice/frost formation with venting (blowing) 
purge gas was present on the 17-inch flapper valve actuator 
access port foam plug forward (top) corner. Ice and frost 
accumulations on the aft side of the LH2 feedline were the 
result of the cold purge gas impingement. The ice and frost 
formations were acceptable for the FRF per NSTS-08303. MPS 
evaluated the venting/blowing purge gas and deemed the condi-
tion acceptable for the firing. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle with no flight hardware contact or TPS damage. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of 3 OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001, assessed by the Ice Team on the pad, documented an 
ice/frost formation with blowing (venting) purge gas on the 
forward (top) corner of the LH2 umbilical 17-inch flapper valve 
torque tool access port TPS plug closeout. The ice/frost forma-
tion was acceptable per NSTS-08303. The venting/blowing purge 
'	 gas was evaluated by MPS and deemed acceptable for the FRI. 
Anomaly 002 documented a TPS .
 crack in the intertank foam (-Y-Z 
quadrant) in the first stringer valley between the -Y thrust 
panel and the GUCP beginning at the LH2 tank-to-intertank 
flange and propagating forward. The crack was approximately 
18-20 inches in length, 1/4-inch wide with no offset, and was 
not filled with ice or frost. IPR 49V-0314 was upgraded to a PR 
and dispositioned to use-as-is based on experience with similar 
TPS cracks at this location. 
Anomaly 003 recorded a suspect crack in the -Y vertical strut 
cable tray forward facing surface at the tank acreage interface 
with possible ice/frost in the crack. An inspection will be 
performed after the FRI.
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FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB holddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of ice/frost were 
present on the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. There was no 
apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP. The GH2 
vent line modification prevented ice from forming, but some 
ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUCP legs 
and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. No icicles had formed on the GOX 
vent ducts.
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Thermal stresses caused a crack in the intertank TPS	 (-Y-Z 
quadrant)	 in the first stringer valley adjacent to the -Y 
'	 thrust panel beginning at the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange and 
propagating forward. The crack was 18-20 inches long,	 1/4-inch 
wide with no offset, and was not filled with ice or frost. 
23 C'CNAL rAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
' 
__ 1 ••• V 
V	 ____
No anomalies were visible on the LOL ET/()RB umbilical 
25
	
	 OF!CNAL ri..: 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
APJ4 
4
Ice/frost accumulations on the top and outboard sides of the 
, LH2 ET/ORB were umbilical typical. There were no unusual vapors 
emanating from the umbilical nor any evidence of cryogenic 
drips.
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Ice/frost had formed on the thin TPS around the aft pyrotechn 
, canister closeout and bondline. A 4-inch ice/frost formation 
with venting (blowing) purge gas was present on the 17-inch 
flapper valve actuator access port foam plug forward corner. 
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Ice and frost accumulations on the aft side of the LH2 feedline 
,	 were the result of cold purge gas impingement from the venting 
(blowing) TPS plug closeout. Ice/frost in the recirculation 
line bellows, feedline bellows, and purge vents was typical. 
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33 POST DRAIN INSPECTION 
A post-drain walkdown of the SSV and the MLP was performed at 
Pad-39B on 7 April 1992 from 1240 to 1530 hours. 
There was no visible TPS damage, such as divots or cracks, on 
the ET L02 or LH2 tank acreage. The Ice Team had reported the 
presence of an 18-20 inch crack in the TPS of the first 
stringer valley between the -Y thrust panel and GUCP (intertank 
-Y-Z quadrant) during the T-3 hour inspection. The crack had no 
offset, no ice/frost, and was not venting. The crack closed 
during tank warm-up and was not visible during the Post Drain 
Inspection. Disposition of the IPR accepted the condition for 
launch since it was typical of structural flexure cracks 
previously observed and the area was outside the debris zone. 
The tumble valve cover was intact. There were no significant 
anomalies on the -Y side of the nosecone, fairing, louver, and 
footprint area. Five small areas of topcoat were missing near 
the grid due to chafing from.the GOX vent seal and were faired 
in with adjacent topcoat. 
Both bipod jack pad closeouts were intact. There was no 
evidence of debonds or cracks. 
A hands-on inspection of the L02 feedline support brackets 
revealed crushed/damaged BX-250, approximately 3.5"xl", on the 
outboard side of the XT-1129 attach point at the feedline 
surface. The damaged area was repaired with PDL foam. Some 
minor SLA damage occurred on the boomerang bracket. 
No cracks were visible in either +Y or -Y thrust strut-to-
longeron interfaces. A 4"x3"xl" divot occurred on the +Y 
longeron closeout near the thrust strut interface. The divot, 
which exposed the substrate /primer and was most likely caused 
by a foam defect along with the contraction and expansion of 
tanking/detanking, was repaired with PDL. 
The Ice Team also reported the presence of a 6 inch long crack 
on the forward face of the -Y vertical strut cable tray. The 
crack had closed during tank warm-up, but was still visible 
during the Post Drain Inspection. A stress relief cut in the 
TPS to allow for structural movement had been deleted by design 
on this tank at the factory. Since the surface is not cryogenic 
and sufficient foam remained for ascent aerothermal loads, the 
crack was accepted for launch. 
Neither the L02 or LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals exhibited TPS 
anomalies. The 17-inch flapper valve torque tool access port 
TPS plug was not venting helium purge gas at the time of the 
Post Drain Inspection, but was replaced prior to the launch 
countdown since it was defective during the FRF. 
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There were no visible TPS anomalies on the LH2 aft dome apex 
and none of the plug pull repairs were protruding. No TPS 
defects appeared on the manhole cover closeout rings. 
No anomalies were visible on the Orbiter SS's. Tile material 
was missing from a 10 11 x3" area on the body flap stub between 
SS #2 and #3 near the body flap hinge. Loss of this material 
was most likely caused by SSME ignition vibration/acoustics. A 
4"xl" orange GSE tile shim, which is not flight hardware, 
protruded from the +Z side of the body flap near SS #2. Three 
areas of tile damage, the largest of which measured 
1.5"xl"xO.25", were present outboard of the L02 ET/ORB umbili-
cal. The damage was not caused by ice falling from the ET L02 
feedline. 
No anomalies were visible on the SRB's and the MLP. 
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P There were no significant anomalies on the nosecone, fairing, and louvers. Five small areas of topcoat were missing near the 
grid due to chafing from the GOX vent seals. 
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p The thermal stress crack that had appeared in the intertank stringer valley adjacent to the thrust panel had closed during 
tank warm-up and was not visible during the Drain Inspection. 
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A 4"x3"xl" divot occurred on the +Y longeron 
'	 thrust strut interface. The divot exposed the 
and was most likely caused by a combination o 
the expansion/contraction of tanking. 
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Inspection of the L02 feedline support brackets revealed 
'	 crushed/damaged BX-250 on the outboard side of the XT-1129 
attach point at the feedline surface and some minor SLA damage 
on the boomerang bracket.
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40 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The Ice/Frost/Debris Team briefing for launch activities was 
conducted on 6 May 1992 at 1500 hours with the following key 
personnel present: 
S. Higginbotham NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing,, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC ET Processing, Debris Assess 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
A. Biamonte NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
J. Cawby LSOC - SPC Supervisor, ET Mech Sys 
J. Blue LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
R. Seale LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
M. Wollam LSOC- SPC ET Processing 
W. Richards LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
W. Tang LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
Z. Byrns NASA - JSC Level II Integration 
C. Gray MMC	 - MAP ET TPS & Materials Design 
S. 
,
Copsey !'Th'1 C 	 - MAP ET TPS Testing/Certif 
S. Otto MMC	 - LSS ET Processing 
D. Mason !'ff4C	 - LSS ET Processing 
J. Stone RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
T. Shawa RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
G. Schindler USBI - LSS SRB Processing 
C. Cooper MTI	 - LSS SRN Processing 
R. Hillard MTI	 - LSS SRN Processing
These personnel participated in various team activities, 
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and 
contributed to reports contained in this document. 
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4.1 PRE-LIWNCH SSV/PIW DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 6 May 1992 from 1645 - 1800 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-2 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-105 Endeavour (FRF/lst flight), 
ET-43 (LWT 36), and BI-050 SRB's. Documentary photographs were 
taken of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle 
damaging debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload/ 
launch, temporary hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and LD55 were 
installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical until a permanent sensor 
could be designed and installed. The tyg9n tubes are intended 
to remain in place during cryogenic loading and be removed by 
the Ice Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
There were no vehicle anomalies. 
Bolts were loose on an MLP deck plate west of the LH SRB, on a 
deckplate east of the RHSRB, on the north side of the LH2 TSM 
in the BHP 6031 hinged cover, and on the west wall of the HDP 
#6 haunch. Caps/covers were loose on a J-pipe east of the LH 
SRB under the water pipe, on a connection box in the northwest 
corner of the MLP zero level, and on the Portable Purge Unit 
(PPU) electrical receptacle box. Loose debris, TPS trimmings, 
tape, and tie-wraps lay on all south holddown post haunches. 
These discrepancies were either corrected real-time by Pad 
Operations or were entered in S0007, Appendix K. 
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Overall view of the intertank TPS prior to cryogenic loading. A 
' thermal stress crack, which had formed in the first stringer 
valley adjacent to the thrust panel during the FRF cryogenic 
loading, had closed up and is not visible when the tank is at 
ambient temperature.
37 O'L EfkE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
I 
' Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Note installation of 
the 35mm camera, which photographs the External Tank after 
separation from the Orbiter.
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, Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. Note installation of 
the two 16mm cameras, which provide motion picture separation 
footage of the LH SRB and the External Tank. 
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Prior to the Flight Readiness	 Firing, a piece of	 rope was 
observed adhering to the LH2	 tank TPS below the GUCP and 
'	 approximately 85 feet above the ML? deck. Since the rope was on 
the -Z side and not a debris concern,	 and would not affect TPS 
performance, it was not removed prior to launch. 
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Loose debris, rust, MLP deck scale, and foam trimming in the 
SRB hoiddown post haunch areas were removed prior to launch. 
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5.0 LAUNCH 
STS-49 was launched at 7:23:40:00 GMT (19:40:00 local) on 7 May 
1992. 
5.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 7 May 1992 from 1330 to 1505 hours during the two 
hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no 
Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. There 
were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 64.0 F 
Relative Humidity: 	 77.9 % 
Wind Speed:	 13.7 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 330 Degrees 
The portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain surface temperature measure-
ments for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, as 
shown in Figures 3 and 4. 
5.2 ORBITER 
No anomalies were observed on Orbiter tiles, RCC wing leading 
edge panels, or nosecap. All RCS thruster paper covers were 
intact. The water spray boiler plugs were properly configured. 
Light frost was present at the SS #1 and #2 heat shield-to-
nozzle interfaces. The SSME #3 heat shield was dry. An infrared 
scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat 
shield or engine mounted heat shields. No GOX vapors originated 
from inside the SSME nozzles. No condensate was present on base 
heat shield tiles. 
5.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH 
SRB case surface temperatures that ranged from 62 to 67 degrees 
F. In comparison, temperatures measured by the hand-held 
Cyclops radiometer ranged from 62 to 68 degrees F and the GEl 
(Ground Environment Instrumentation) measured temperatures that 
ranged from 64 to 70 degrees F. All measured temperatures were 
above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted 
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PT) supplied by MTI was 67 
degrees F, which was within the required range of 44-86 
degrees F.
42
Figure 3. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
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Figure 4. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
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5.4 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 1030 to 1940 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 5. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
There was light condensate, but no ice/frost accumulation, on 
the L02 tank ogive and barrel sections. There were no TPS 
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The pressuriza-
tion line and support ramps were in nominal configuration. The 
STI measured surface temperatures that ranged from 59 to 62 
degrees F on the ogive and from 57 to 58 degrees F on the 
barrel section. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured 
temperatures that ranged from 58 to 61 degrees F on the ogive 
and from 58 to 60 degrees F on the barrel, while SURFICE 
predicted worst-case temperatures of 54 degrees F on the ogive 
and 51 degrees F on the barrel. 
The intertank TPS acreage was dry. Numerous small frost spots 
were present in the stringer valleys along the LH2 and L02 
tank-to-intertank flanges in the -Y-Z quadrant. No unusual 
vapors or ice formations were present on the ET umbilical 
carrier plate. The only TPS anomaly consisted of a crack in the 
intertank foam (-Y-Z quardrant) in the first stringer valley 
between the -Y thrust panel and the GUCP beginning at the LH2' 
tank-to-intertank flange and propagating forward. The crack was 
approximately 18-20 inches in length, 1/4-inch wide with no 
offset, and was not filled with ice •or frost. The portable STI 
measured surface acreage temperatures that averaged 63 degrees 
and the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that averaged 
65 degrees F. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. The rope adhering 
to the LH2 tank TPS was still present. Light condensate, but no 
ice or frost, accumulated on the acreage and aft dome. The 
portable STI measured surface temperatures that ranged from 54 
to 60 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and from 56 to 61 degrees 
F on the lower LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer 
measured temperatures that ranged from 50 to 55 degrees F on 
the upper LH2 tank and from 53 to 58 degrees F on the lower LH2 
tank. SURFICE predicted temperatures of 48 degrees F on the 
upper LH2 tank and 55 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, bipod jack pad 
closeouts, PAL ramp, cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps, 
longerons, thrust struts, manhole covers, or aft dome apex. A 
3-inch diameter ice/frost spot had formed near the end of the 
PAL ramp at station XT-1528. Two small frost spots had formed 
on the aft faces of both '-Y and +Y ET/SRB cable trays at the 
tank interface. The PDL repair on the +Y longeron closeout was 
intact and no ice or frost was present. A crack 6 inches long, 
first detected during the FRF cryoload, was present in the -Y 
vertical strut cable tray forward facing surface at the tank 
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acreage interface. One small frost spot had formed on the -z 
side of the +Z manhole cover. Some ice/frost, had formed in the 
ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper strut fairingIcpansion joints. 
Ice/frost covered the lower EB fittings outboard to the strut 
pin hole with condensate on the rest of the fitting. The struts 
were dry. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of 
4-inch ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt pyrotechnic 
canister purge vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen 
purge gas had occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and 
launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows 'were wet with 
condensate. 
Isolated ice/frost formations were present on the outboard and 
top sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier. Ice/frost 
' fingers 3-6 inches in length had formed on the pyro canister 
and plate gap purge vents. Ice/frost had also formed on the aft 
pyrotechnic canister bondline. Thin foam exists in this area 
due to an incorrect mold manufaáture. The amount and location 
of the ice/frost was acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 
criteria. (The problem exists through end item EI-66. The mold 
will be changed to add more foam for EI-67 and subs). Normal 
venting of helium purge gas had occurred during tanking, stable 
replenish, and launch. There were no unusual vapors emanating 
from the umbilicals nor any evidence of cryogenic drips. A ring 
of frost had formed on the cable tray vent hole. A 4-5 inch 
diameter ice/frost formation with venting (blowing) purge gas 
, was present on the 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port 
foam plug forward (top) corner. The ice/frost formation was 
acceptable for launch per NSTS-08303. MPS evaluated the 
venting/blowing purge gas and deemed the condition acceptable 
for launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle with no'flight hardware contact or TPS damage. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of 6 OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented an ice/frost formation on the ET/ORB LH2 
umbilical aft pyro can closeout -Y bondline. The condition was 
acceptable per NSTS-08303.
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Anomaly 002 recorded blowing purge gas with ice/frost formation
	 I 
on the 17-inch flapper valve torque tool access port TPS plug 
closeout bond].ine. A blowing gas/loose plug/ice formation as-
sessment was performed. The condition was within the experience 
data base and was acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the -Y-Z quadrant intertank stringer valleys. Ice/frost 
spots also formed on the -Y bipod ramp to tank interface aft 
and outboard side bondlines. These ice and frost formations 
were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 004 recorded ice/frost formations on both the +Y and -Y 
vertical strut cable tray doghouse aft sides at the tank inter-
face. The cable tray support ramp at station XT-1528 exhibited 
an ice/frost spot on the aft side. The ice and frost accumula-
tions were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 005 documented small ice/frost formations on the GOX 
vent exhaust ducts. Calculations performed by Rockwell-Downey 
showed falling particles would not impact Orbiter surfaces. 
Anomaly 006 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets; in the LH2 
recirculation line bellows and burst disks; and on the L02 and 
LH2 umbilical purge vents and baggie material. These formations 
were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
5.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB hoiddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of ice/frost were 
present on the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. There was no 
apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP. The GH2 
vent line modification prevented ice from forming, but some 
ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUCP legs 
and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. Four small icicles less then 1/2-
inch in length had formed on the south GOX vent duct during 
cryoload, but had melted before launch. 
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i ht condensate, but no ice, frost, or TPS anomalies, weie 
present on the acreage of the L02 tank ogive and barrel section 
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Light condensate, but no ice, frost, or TPS anomalies, were 
present on the LH2 tank acreage and aft dome. There were no SRB 
or Orbiter anomalies.
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Overall view of the SSME"s. Ice/frost had accumulated on the 
, SSME #1 and #2 heatshield-to-nozzle interfaces. An infrared 
scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat 
shield or engine mounted heat shields. 
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Ice/frost and condensate were present on the SSME #1 heat 
shield-to-nozzle interface.
53	 C;cL.:L 'GE 
COLOR PHDTORAPH
10 
7f 
7 
• •.,	 ,.	 rç	 .	 ': 
• 
c.
lb IL 
-
.	 .-:	 . 
•	 •	 •-'	 .. Tj.	 •	 .••.	 •f 
•	
.',	 •2	 •	 •I. 
£	 .
: 
A
b 
* -
-'.-•.•-.- -
The thermal stress crack in the intertank T 
adjacent to the -Y thrust panel reappeared 
loading. Characteristics of the crack (18-20 
inch wide with no offset, and not filled with 
not changed since FRF.
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Ice/frost formations in the L02 feedline support brackets and 
lower bellows were acceptable per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
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A craç 6 inches long, first detected during the FRF cryoload, 
res , was pent in the -Y vertical strut cable tray forward facing 
surface at the tank acreage interface. A stress relief cut in 
the TFS to allow for structural movement had been deleted by 
design.
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There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice 
and frost formations on the purge vents were typical. Normal 
venting of nitrogen purge gas had occurred during tanking, 
stable replenish, and launch.
57
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
I I
% 
>
't1..ii *1 .5 -I
.	 .,; ç!' 
- I	 - 
--S.
11 
Ll 
\
NA.
 
View of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. There were no unusual vapoLs
 
emanating from the umbilical nor any evidence of cryogenic 
drips. Ice/frost accumulations on the umbilical purge vents and 
on the top/outboard sides of the umbilical were typical. 
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Ice/frost formations on the lower plate gap purge vent and in 
the LH2 recirculation line bellows were typical. The 17-inch 
flapper valve actuator tool access port TPS plug closeout 
, exhibited a blowing purge gas leak and a 4-inch diameter ice 
formation at the forward corner. The ice formation was accept-
able per NSTS-08303. MPS evaluated the venting/blowing purge 
gas and deemed the condition acceptable for flight. 
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6.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the ML? and the FSS was conducted 
on 7 May 1992 from Launch+1-1/2 to 3 hours. No flight hardware 
or TPS materials were found. 
South SRB holddown post erosion was typical. All south HDP shim 
material was intact, but slightly debonded at the sidewall on 
HDP #1, #5, and #6. The inboard edge of the bottom shim plate 
was debonded on.HDP #1 and #6. The shim material on HDP #2 was 
completely debonded. There was no visual indication of a stud 
hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. There were no 
ordnance fragments found in the south holddown post stud holes. 
All of the north post doghouse blast covers were in the closed 
position and exhibited typical erosion. The SRB aft skirt purge 
lines were in place but slightly damaged. The SRB T-O umbili-
cals exhibited minor damage. 
The GOX vent arm, OAA, and TSM's showed the usual minor amount 
of damage. As observed on OTV prior to launch, an oxygen sensor 
line was hanging from the white room. The GH2 vent arm was 
latched on the eighth tooth of the latching mechanism and had 
no loose cables (static retract lanyard). The GH2 vent • line 
retracted nominally, though the north latch appeared to have 
contacted the north saddle stabilizer. The damage from this 
contact was minimal and has occurred on previous launches. The 
GH2 vent line showed typical signs of SRB . plume impingement. 
The ET intertank access structure also sustained typical plume 
heating effects. 
Damage to the facility appeared to be less than usual and 
included: 
1. A cable tray cover found on the north side of the FSS 
235 foot level originated from the cable tray directly 
above the stairway on that level. 
2. Light fixtures on the lIT access arm were detached from 
support mounts and held only by the electrical cables. 
3. OIS handset box cover detached and lying below box on 
FSS 255 foot level north side. 
4. 3/4-inch FSS bolt end with nut attached found on east 
side of FSS 115 foot level. 
5. ML? electrical box, located at the northeast corner of 
ML?, was missing a cover. 
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on 
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage. 
Pad B acreage was inspected on 8 May 1992. The only flight 
hardware found was two FRSI plugs: one in the boxcar area west 
of the pad, and the other near the SSME ESP park site. One 
electrical panel cover was found on the southwest pad slope. 
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An inspection of the beach from UCS-9 to the Titan complex, 
the beach road, the railroad tracks, and the water areas 
around the pad and under the flight path revealed no flight 
hardware or TPS materials. 
MLP-2 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of 
both TSM's, at the bottom of both SRB exhaust holes, and at 
the bottom of the SSME exhaust hole. All sensor readings were 
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits. 
Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in-a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separa-
tion (due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). 
Most of the signal registrations were very weak and often 
barely detectable, which generally compares with the types of 
particles detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 62 
particles were imaged in the T+142.5 to 329 second time 
period. Sixteen of the particles were imaged by only one 
radar, 30 particles were imaged by two radars, and 16 par-
ticles were imaged by all three radars.
	 - 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 11. 
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Plume erosion of the south SRB hoiddown posts was typical. EPON 
shim material was intact, but debonded along the sidewalls. 
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' North HDP blast covers were in the closed position and 
exhibited typical SRB plume erosion effects with some loss of 
material at the corners.
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The SRB T-O umbilicals sustained minor damage 
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7.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were 
presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, 
and vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in 
Section 11. 
7.1 FLIGHT READINESS FIRING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 59 film and video items, which included 23 videos, 
thirty-one 16mm high speed films, and five 35mm large format 
films, of the OV-105 Flight Readiness Firing were reviewed. 
There were no significant anomalies. 
Film items E-76, 77, 19, 20 showed a fore-and-aft movement 
(diaphram-like flexing) of the Orbiter base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster during engine start-
up. The movement subsided as the SSME plume stabilized and the 
Mach diamonds formed. Measurements of E-76 on the S.F.A.T. 
Film Analyzer showed the amplitude was 1.1 inches. Structures 
engineering assessed the condition and found no anomaly. 
SSME ignition and gimbal profile appeared normal. Flashes 
appeared in the SSME #2 Mach diamond almost continuously (E-2, 
3, 19, 20; OTV 151, 170). Three particles, all approximately 
, 3"xl", fell from an area behind SS #2 and #3 after SSME ig-
nition but before Mach diamond formation (E-19 frames 2231, 
2709; E-20 frames 2215, 2230, 2721; OTV 170) . The particles, 
black on one side and white on the other side, were most 
likely the pieces of tile material lost from the +Z side of 
the body flap near the hinge. 
The -Y OMS nozzle cover started to come loose at the end of 
the firing, but remained intact and attached to the vehicle 
(E-20). Four pieces of coating material fell from the 
southeast hydrogen Ignitor (on the L02 TSM) at the start of 
SSME ignition and during shut down (E-19 frame 5907; OTV 170). 
The material fell into the SSME plume and did not appear to 
contact the SSME nozzle. 
SS ignition caused ice/frost on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical to 
shake loose. Numerous pieces contacted and were deflected by 
the umbilical cavity sill, but no tile damage was visible. 
There were no unusual vapors or cryogenic drips before, 
during, and after SSME firing (OTV 109). 
ET nosecone deflection, as measured from film item E-79 on the 
S.F.A.T. film analyzer, was 35 inches at the greatest deflec-
tion from the "zero" start position. The vehicle returned to 
the 12-inch mark before starting another "twang" cycle. There 
were five distinct cycles during SSME firing. SSME shut down I
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caused the vehicle to oscillate between the plus 10-inch and 
minus 10-inch marks. Total excursion of the ET spike during 
the FRF was 45 inches (Reference Figure 6). 
Excursion of the ET at the GUCP followed a similar pattern, 
but with smaller amplitudes, to the nosecone deflection 
(reference Figure 7). 
The TSM L02 T-0 umbilical had been instrumented with position 
measuring devices to measure the umbilical excursion during 
cryoload and FRF. Data obtained from the devices and from film 
item E-21 as measured on the S.F.A.T. film analyzer, showed 
the umbilical had moved downward during slow fill a maximum of 
0.44 inches due to the weight of the ET cryogenics. By the end 
of slow fill, the ET was contracting from the low tempera-
tures, which caused an upward movement. Upon completion of LH2 
fast fill, the umbilical had moved upward a maximum of 2.75 
inches above the initial pre-cryoload position. Firing of the 
SSME's during the FRI caused the umbilical to move upward an 
additional 9 inches reaching a maximum excursion of 10.7 
inches (reference Figure 8). 
Firex coverage of the SS's and base heat shield area after 
main engine shut down was good. Strong winds prevented a large 
percentage of Firex water from reaching the ET/ORB L02 and LH2 
umbilicals (OTV 155, 156, 163)
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Figure 6. ET Tip Deflection 
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7.2 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 110 film and video data items, which included 
forty-one videos, forty-four 16mm films, twenty 35mm films, 
four 70mm films, and one 16mm on-orbit film from the L02 
ET/ORB umbilical, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
Film items E-76, 77, 19, 20 again showed a fore-and-aft 
movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the centerline 
area between the SSME cluster during engine start-up. The 
movement subsided as the SSME plume stabilized and the Mach 
diamonds formed. Measurements of E-76 on the film analyzer 
showed the amplitude was 1.1 inches (reference Figure 9). 
Research of previous launches and FRF's showed that movement 
had also occurred on the other Orbiters. Detection of move-
ment in some cases was prevented by lack of lighting, hydrogen 
ignitor smoke, or camera vibration. Although it now seems evi-
dent this movement is common to the Orbiter fleet, struc-
tures engineers are interested in measuring the amplitude and 
frequency of the movement for further analysis. 
, SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile 
appeared normal. Free burning hydrogen drifted upward to the 
OMS pods (RSS STI, C/S-2 STI, OTV 151, 170, E-2, 3, 19, 20) 
ET nosecone deflection, as measured from film item E-79 on the 
S.F.A.T. film analyzer, was 35 inches at the greatest deflec-
tion from the "zero" start position. The vehicle returned to 
the 12-inch mark before launch (reference Figure 10). 
SSME ignition vibration and acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from three places on the base of the 
RH RCS stinger (E-19) and from three locations on the Orbiter 
base heat shield. SS #2 and #3 engine mounted heat shields 
exhibited slight side to side motion (white RTV joint 
referenced to stationary base heat shield tiles) caused by 
SSME ignition movement/vibration (E-23, 24). 
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice/frost to fall from 
the ET/Orbiter umbilicals, the LH2 feedline bellows, the LH2 
recirculation line bellows, and two ice/frost spots on the aft 
surface of the -Y vertical strut. No damage to Orbiter tiles 
or ET TPS was visible (OTV 109, 154, 156, 163, 164, E-4) . Ice, 
the largest piece measuring 6 11 x]." inch, fell from the L02 
feedline upper bellows, but no contact with Orbiter tiles was 
visible (E-1, 3, 5, 6, 25) . There were no unusual vapors or 
cryogenic drips near the ET/ORS umbilicals during tanking, 
stable replenish, ignition, or liftoff (OTV 109, 154, 163). 
70
,o 
C
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The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and 
retracted properly (OTV 149, 163). The LH2 purge barrier was 
caught in the TSM door after LH2 T-0 retraction (OTV 170, 
E-18) Separation of the GUC? from the External Tank was 
nominal. The GH2 vent arm retracted and latched properly with 
no rebound. There was no excessive slack in the static 
retract lanyard (OTV-104, 171, E-33, 41, 42, 48, 50). Film 
item E-60 confirmed that water flowed properly from all MLP 
rairibirds. 
No stud hang-ups occurred on the SRB holddown posts and no 
ordnance debris fell from the HDP DCS/stud holes. A piece of 
instafoam broke off near the LH SRB aft skirt nitrogen purge 
line (E-13) . 
Six pieces of ice fell aft from the LH2 umbilical during the 
roll maneuver. The piece of rope on the -z side of the Exter-
nal Tank was still attached to the SOFI after tower clear. No 
anomalies were observed in the area of the ET intertank where 
the 20-inch stringer valley TPS crack had occurred during 
cryoload (E-59). 
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after the 
roll maneuver were traced to the forward RCS thrusters and 
were pieces of RCS paper covers. Other pieces of RCS paper 
covers were visible passing over the Orbiter wings. 
White flashes appeared in the SSME plume shortly after the 
roll maneuver and may be. related to atmospheric effects. Two 
orange streaks occurred in the SSME #1 plume during ascent at 
approximately 39 and 44 seconds MET (E-212, 220). 
Movement of the body flap was less visible than that observed 
on previous flights (E-212). 
One piece of LH SRB thermal curtain tape was loose on the -z 
side of the aft skirt (E-212). 
Light colored particles fell out of the SRB exhaust plume 
during ascent and were most likely pieces of SRB propellant 
(E-207) 
ET aft dome charring, plume recirculation, and SRB separation 
appeared normal. Several instances of plume brightening, which 
have been observed on previous flights, occurred during 
tailoff (TV-13, E-205, 218)
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7.3 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMRI 
DTO-0312 was not performed by the crew due to dark conditions. 
OV-105 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: one 35mm and 
one 16mm with a 5mm lens. (The other 16mm camera with the 10mm 
lens had been deleted prior to launch due to an interference 
problem). 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have been a safety of flight concern. Erosion and 
charring of TPS on the aft surfaces of the LH2 umbilical cable 
tray and the -Y vertical strut/cable tray was typical. Plume 
recirculation and aft dome heating caused the usual charring 
and "popcorning" of the NCFI foam. Plume recirculation was also 
responsible for the sooting of the LH aft booster, an expected 
occurrence. Separation of the -Y ET/SRB upper and diagonal 
struts was nominal. No loss of TPS from the upper strut fairing 
was visible. No anomalies were observed on the LH SRB segment 
cases and joints, forward skirt, and frustum after separation 
from the ET. 
The footage of External Tank separation contained little usable 
data due, to the dark conditions. 
7.4 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 17 film and video data items, which included seven 
videos, eight 16mm high speed films, and two 35mm large format 
films, were reviewed. 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC), 
landing gear deployment, flare, final approach, and touchdown 
appeared normal. Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. 
First use of the drag chute, which was deployed just after nose 
wheel touchdown, was nominal. No vehicle damage or significant 
tile damage was visible in these views. 
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LH2 ET/ORE umbilical separation camera showed typical erosion 
and charring of TPS on the aft surfaces of the umbilical cable 
tray and -Y vertical strut. Plume recirculation and aft dome 
heating caused the usual charring and "popcorning" of the NCFI 
foam.
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LH2 ET/ORB umbilical separation camera showed no vehicle damage 
or loss of flight hardware that would have been a safety of 
flight concern. Separation of the LH SRB from the External Tank 
was normal. No loss of TPS from the upper strut fairing was 
visible.
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8.0 SBB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 11 May 1992 from 0800 to 
1130 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB's were in 
excellent condition. 
8.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 5 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners (Figure 11). Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint 
had occurred along the 395 ring. All BSM aero heatshield covers 
were locked in the fully opened position. However, two (right 
side) cover attach rings had been bent at the hinge by 
parachute riser entanglement. 
The RH forward. skirt exhibited no debOnds or missing TPS 
(Figure 12). The phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were 
intact. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred on the 
systems tunnel cover and around the forward attach point. The 
forward separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to have 
separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum 
severance ring. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
' generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the 
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting 
from severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. A 5"xl.5" 
area of TPS on the forward side of the upper strut fairing at 
the separation plane was missing but the substrate was not 
charred. The loss of TPS in this area may have occurred after 
strut separation. The ETISRB aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA 
covers appeared undamaged. The new RTV 1422 closeout was 
intact. All three aft booster stiffener rings sustained water 
impact damage. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate 
closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring had de].aminated. Ten 
K5NA protective domes were lost from bolt heads on the aft side 
of the phenolic kick ring prior to water impact (sooted 
substrate). The aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good 
condition (Figure 13). 
All Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated 
properly with the exception of HDP #4, which was obstructed by 
frangible nut halves. This was the seventh flight utilizing the 
optimized link. None of the EPON shim material was lost during 
ascent.
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The RE frustum was missing no TPS but had 5 MSA-2 debonds ovei 
fasteners. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint had occurred 
along the 395 ring. Two (right side) aero heat shield cover 
attach rings had been bent at the hinge by riser entanglement. 
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' The RB forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Minor 
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred in localized areas. 
Both RSS antenna phenolic plates were intact. 
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SRN segment cases, Field Joint Protection System (FJPS), and 
GEl cork run closeouts were in good condition.
P1-.G. 
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Post flight condition of the RH aft booster. The aft skirt 
acreage TPS was sooted but in good condition. The ET/SRB aft 
struts, ETA ring, and lEA appeared undamaged. All three aft 
booster stiffener rings sustained water impact damage.
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ea of TPS on the forward side of the upper strut 
, fairing at the separation plane was missing but the substrate 
was not charred. The loss of TPS may have occurred during strut 
separation.
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8.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 9 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners. There was minor localized blistering of the Hypalon 
paint (Figure 14). The BSM aero heatshield covers were locked 
in the fully opened position. 
The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact though the 
material on the +Z antenna plate had delazuinated (Figure 15). 
The forward separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to 
have separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum 
severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred 
near the ET/SRB attach point and on the systems tunnel cover. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl 
cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from severance of 
the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. A 4.5"x3" 
area of TPS on the forward side of the upper strut fairing at 
the separation plane was missing and the substrate showed signs 
of heating. The loss of TPS in this area may have occurred 
during ascent or descent, but was not visible in the umbilical 
film at the time of strut separation. The ET/SRB aft struts, 
ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. The new RTV 
1422 closeout was intact. All three aft booster stiffener rings 
sustained water impact damage. The aft booster stiffener ring 
splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was 
missing. 
Two K5NA protective domes were missing from bolt heads on the 
aft side of the phenolic kick ring prior to water impact 
(charred substrate). K5NA was missing from all aft BSM nozzles 
(Figure 16). The aft skirt acreage TPS was in good condition. 
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were properly 
seated. This was the seventh flight utilizing the optimized 
link. None of the EPON shim material was lost prior to water 
impact.
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The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had -) MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners. There was minor localized blistering of the Hypalon 
paint. The BSM aero heat shield covers were locked in the fully 
opened position.
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' The LH forward skirt exhibited no MSA-2 debonds or missing TPS. 
The phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact, though 
the material on the +Z plate had delaminated. 
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Post flight condition of the LH aft booster/aft skirt. The aft 
skirt acreage TPS was sooted but generally in good condition. 
'	 The ET/SRB aft	 struts,	 lEA, and ETA ring appeared undamaged. 
All three aft booster stiffener rings sustained water impact 
damage.
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P A 4.5"x" area of TPS on the forward side of the upper strut fairing at the separation plane was missing and the substrate 
showed signs of heating. The loss of TPS may have occurred 
during strut separation.
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8.3 RECOVERED SEB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS) 
housings revealed an overall system retention of 98 percent and 
individual hoiddown post retention percentages as listed: 
% of Nut without
HDP # 2 large halves 
1 91 
2 99 
3 99 
4 .	 99 
5 99 
6 99 
7 100 
8 99
% of Ordnance 
fragments. % Overall 
95 93 
92 99 
99 99 
55	 . 83 
95 99 
100 99 
99 99 
97 .	 99 
STS-49 was the seventh flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the hoiddown post DCS's. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance 
debris. Overall percentages of retention for the five previous 
flights utilizing the "optimized" link are: 
BI-044 81-045 BI-046 81-047 BI-048 B1049 
HDP # STS-40 STS-43 STS-48 STS-44 STS-42 STS45 
1 99% 98% 99% 99% 99 99 
2 99% 31% 88% 99% 98 99 
3 38% 99% 99% 99% 99 99 
4 99% 99% 99% 99% 99 97 
5 23% 99%	 . 58% 99% 99 99 
6 99% 9996 99% 99% 99 99 
7 62% 99% 99% 99% 99 8 
8 99% 99% 99% 99% 99 99 
TOTAL 77% 90% 92% 99% 99% 87%
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 11. 
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9.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-105 (Endeavour) was 
conducted on May 16-17, 1992, atAmes-Dryden (EAFB) on runway 
22 and in the Mate/Demate Device (D). This inspection was 
performed to identify debris impact damage, and if possible, 
debris sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 114 hits, 
of which 11 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. This 
total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat 
shield attributed to engine vibration/acoustics and exhaust 
plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to.statis-
tics from 31 previous missions of similar configuration 
(excluding missions STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42 which 
had damage from known debris sources), indicates that the total 
number of hits is slightly less than average and the number of 
hits one inch or larger is much less than average. Figures 17-
20 show the TPS debris damage assessment for STS-49. 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 55 hits, of 
which 6 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The 
distribution of hits on the lower surface does not point to a 
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice 
and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random sources. 
The most significant hit observed measured 9-5/8 x 2-5/8 x 1/4 
inches and was located on the right side of the vehicle just 
aft of the nosecap RCC. The size and depth of this damage site 
is indicative of an impact by a low density material such as 
External Tank (ET) TPS foam. 
The following table breaks down the STS-49 Orbiter debris 
damage by area:
HITS > 1"
	 TOTAL HITS 
Lower surface 6 55 
Upper surface 1 39 
Right side 1 7 
Left side 2 6 
Right OMS Pod 1 4 
Left OMS Pod 0 3 
TOTALS 11 114
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in good condition for a concrete runway landing. 
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Figure 17. 
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
1 x 3/8 x 1/8 
2-1/4 x 1 x 1/8 
PROTRUDING GAP FILLERS 
FOUR HITS 
<.1 INCH
SEVEN HITS WITH 
ONE 1 1 INCH 
(1-1/4 x 3/4 x 3/8) 
PROTRUDING GAP FILLER
TOTAL HITS = 
HITS;_>1INCH= 6 
All DIMENSIONS 
IN INCHES 
1-1/4 x 7/8 x 1/4	
1-1/8 x 5/8 x 1/4 
1-1/4 x 1 x 1/4 
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9-5/8 x 2-5/8 x 1/4 
YELLOW STAIN ON 
VENT DOOR #9 TPS 
TOTAL HITS = 
HITS i INCH = 1
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DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
ELLOW DISCOLORATION 
N VENT DOOR #9 TPS 
-1/2 x 
3/8 x 1/8 
T ON LOWER (-Z) 
DGE OF DRAG CHUTE 
COMPARTMENT OPENING
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OOR #3 TPS 
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DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
PROTRUDING 
GAP FILLER 
LOCATED ON 
SURFACE OF 
ELEVON
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Figure 20 
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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The following items were found on the runway underneath the RH 
ET/Orbiter umbilical door: a 3/4-inch long segment of a Jo-
bolt, a 1/2-inch OD by 1/4-inch ID by 1/16-inch thick spacer 
(washer), and a 1/2-inch long 10-32 Torx head screw (Part No 
MD 112-1003-04). A 7/16-inch long 10-32 Torx head screw (Part 
No. MD 112-1003-04 SPS) was found on the runway underneath the 
LH ET/Orbiter umbilical door. Problem Report LAF-5-02-0038 was 
written to document the items found beneath the RH door and PR 
LAF-5-02-0037 was written to document the one item found under 
the LH door. 
All ET/Orbiter (EO) separation ordnance device plungers 
appeared to have functioned properly. However, the red 
spacer/shim in the bowl of EO-2 (LH side) was displaced forward 
approximately 1/4 inch. The stop-bolts on the EO-1 separation 
assembly did not sustain any damage/bending. 
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was much less than normal. 
There were no indications of tile damage in the center of the 
base heat shield resulting from the "oscillations" observed in 
launch motion picture photography. Several tiles on the center-
line of the body flap stub upper surface and adjacent tiles on 
the body flap upper surface were damaged. The cause of this 
damage is unknown and is under investigation by TPS engineer-
ing. The main engine Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) blankets 
P
were intact and showed no signs of fraying. 
All Orbiter windows exhibited typical hazing. A few small 
streaks were present on windows #3 and #4. Laboratory analysis 
will be performed on samples taken from all windows. During the 
8th flight day, an impact on window #1 was photographed by the 
crew. Post flight assessment showed a crater depth of 0.003897 
inches, which is over six times the maximum depth of 0.0006 
inches. 
Samples were 'take ' n from other selected sites for laboratory 
analysis (reference Figure 21) 
The TPS blankets covering both the RH and LH #9 vent doors 
exhibited a yellowish discoloration, which appeared similar, 
although not as pronounced, as that observed on the OV-103 RH 
vent door #7 after the STS-42 mission. Two PRs were written by 
TPS engineering to document this anomaly. LH vent door #3 
exhibited a light brown discoloration, but was not documented 
on a PR since TPS engineering determined that this discolora-
tion was caused by normal aero-heating. 
A number of damage sites were noted on the perimeter tiles of 
the Orbiter windows (reference Figure 20). Most of the impact 
sites were only surface coating losses or were no more than 
1/16th inch deep. This damage may have been caused by the RTV 
used to bond paper covers to the FRCS nozzles or by exhaust 
products from the SRB booster separation motors. 
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Figure 21 
CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS
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An infrared radiometer was used to measure the surface tempera-
ture of several areas of the Orbiter TPS after landing (per 
OSD V09AJO.095). Ninety-seven minutes after wheel stop, the 
Orbiter nosecap RCC was 162 degrees F, the RH wing leading edge 
RCC panel #9 was 143 degrees F, and the RH wing leading edge 
RCC panel #17 was 140 degrees F (reference Figure 22). The wing 
RCC panel temperatures are approximately 55 degrees F above 
average. After an investigation of this phenomenon, JSC RCC 
sub-system engineering concluded that the observed elevated 
temperatures were within expected limits and were caused by the 
combination of high ambient temperature, low wind speed, and 
the new "double type A" coating used on the OV-105 RCC panels. 
Runway 15 was inspected by the Debris Team on May 15, 1992 and 
all potentially damaging debris was removed. Runway 22 was 
inspected and swept by Air Force personnel on the same day. 
Both runways were found to be in acceptable condition for 
landing. 
A post-landing inspection of runway 22 was performed 
immediately after landing. The only unanticipated flight 
hardware items found were two Tempilabels, which probably 
originated from the landing gear/wheel wells. 
This flight marked the first use of the Orbiter drag chute. 
' According to Deceleration
. System engineering, the drag chute
 functioned nominally. However, two tiles, one on the lower 
(-Z) edge of the drag chute opening and the other on the LH 
lower edge of the vertical stabilizer "stinger", were damaged 
by the drag chute deployment (reference Figure 24). All drag 
chute hardware was recovered and showed no signs of abnormal 
operation. The drag chute mortar cover was found approximately 
5,650 feet from the Orbiter, 50 feet to the left of the'runway 
centerline. The chute door was found approximately fifty feet 
closer to the Orbiter on the runway centerline. Four distinct 
door impact marks were observed to the left of the runway 
centerline. The sabot and attached pilot chute bag were another 
10 feet closer to the Orbiter and 10 feet left of the center-
line. The pilot chute was an additional 30 feet closer to the 
orbiter and 15 feet right of the centerline. The main chute was 
located approximately 750 feet from the Orbiter. just to the 
right of the centerline. 
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was 
slightly less than average and the number of hits with a major 
dimension of one inch or greater was much less than average 
when compared to previous flights (reference Figures 23-25). 
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 11. 
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Figure 22 
STS- 49 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS 
RECORDED BY THE SHUTTLE THERMAL IMAGER 
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FIGURE 23. ORBITER POSTFLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE 
HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS 
STS-6 15 80 36 120 
STS-8 3 29 7 56 
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58 
STS- 11(41-B) 11 19 34 63 
STS- 13(41-C) 5	 . 27 8 36 
STS-14 (41-D) .	 10 44 30 111 
STS- 17 (4 1 -G) 25 69 36 154 
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87 
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81 
STS-27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141 
STS-28(51-J) 7 66 17 111 
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129	 . 34 183 
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257 
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193 
STS-29 18 100 23 132 
STS-28R 13 60 20 76 
STS-34 17 51 18 53 
STS-33R 21 .	 107 21 .	 118 
STS-32R 13 111 15 120 
STS-36 17 61 19 81 
STS-31R 13 47 14 63 
STS-41 13 64 16 76 
STS-38 7 70 8 81 
STS-35 15 132 17 147 
STS-37 7 91 10 113 
STS-39 14 217 16 238 
STS-40 23 153 25 197 
STS-43 24 122 25 131 
STS-48 14 100 25 182 
STS-44 6 74 9 101 
STS-45 .	 18 .	 122 22 172 
AVERAGE 15.4 88.2 22.4 120.4 
SIGMA	 . 72 44.4 10.7 54.8 
...	 :::..:,...:.....
.	 .... .:	 ,.,
MISSIONS STS-23,24,25,26,26R, 27R, 30R, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES 
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This flight marked the first use of the Orbiter drag chute, 
which functioned normally. The drag chute compartment door and 
the sabot/pilot chute bag are visible at the right side of the 
frame.
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Deployment of the drag chute was nominal. The risers did not 
contact the SS	 #1 nozzle or the rudder/speed brake. 
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• 
Post deploy positions of the drag chute compartment door, sabot 
P with attached pilot chute bag, and pilot chute on the runway. Note white impact marks made by the drag chute compartment 
door.
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' The drag chute was located approximately 750 feet aft of the 
Orbiter and just to the right of the centerline. All drag chute 
hardware was recovered and showed no anomalies. 
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Overall view of Orbiter left side. Note discolored vent door #3
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Overall view of Orbiter right side. 
Note tile damage site just aft of the nose cap. 
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Tile damage site on the right side of the Orbiter just aft of 
the nosecap RCC measured 9-5/8 x 2-5/8 x 1/4 inches. The size 
and depth is indicative of an impact by a low density material 
such as External Tank TPS foam. 
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, A segment of a Jo-bolt, a spacer (washer) , and a ToLx head 
screw were found on the runway under the RH ET/ORB umbilical 
door. A second Torx head screw lay on the runway under the LH 
ET door.
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. All sepm..ii 
ordnance devices appeared to have functioned properly. 
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation 
ordnance devices appeared to have functioned properly. 
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A small plastic bag was found lodged between the 16mm 
umbilical separation camera and the thermal window pane 
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Discoloration on RH vent door #9 
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Non-Orbiter debris collected from Runway 22 during the

Post Landing Runway Debris Inspection 
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10.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS 
A total of 19 samples were obtained from Orbiter OV-105 during 
the STS-49 post landing debris assessment at Ames-Dryden Flight 
Research Facility, California (Figure 25). The 19 submitted 
samples consisted of 9 window wipes, 5 wing leading edge RCC 
samples (2 LH, 3 RH), 1 residual sample from the lower surface 
body flap tiles, and 2 residual samples from Orbiter vent door 
#9 (LH/RH) discoloration. The samples were analyzed by the NASA 
KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material composi-
tion and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis 
involved the placing and correlating of sample particles with 
respect to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and 
availability. Debris sample results and analyses are listed by 
Orbiter location in the following summaries. 
Orbiter Windows 
Results of the window sample analysis revealed the presence of 
the following materials: 
1. Metallics 
2. RTV, silica tile, glass fibers, insulation 
3. Paints, salt, rust 
4. Organics and organic fibers 
5. Earth compounds 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Metallic particles (zinc, aluminum, and carbon steel 
alloys) are common to SRB BSM exhaust residue, but are 
not considered a debris concern in this quantity 
(micrometer) and have not generated a known debris 
effect. 
2. RTV, silica tile, glass fibers, and insulation 
originate from Orbiter TPS (thermal protection system). 
3. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; salt 
is a naturally-occurring landing site product; rust is 
an SRB BSM exhaust residue. 
4. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method; results are pending. 
This detailed process is more difficult due to small 
sample quantity. Organic fibers originated from the 
sample cloth used for sampling. 
5. Earth compounds (muscovite, phosphorus, iron-silicon-
calcium, and calcium-potassium rich materials and 
alpha-quartz) originate from the landing site. 
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Orbiter Wing RCC 
Results of the Orbiter wing RCC samples indicated the presence 
of the following materials: 
1. Silica tile, tile coating (black), RTV 
2. Paint, rust, salt 
3. Earth compounds 
4. Organics and organic fibers 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Silica tile, black tile coating and RTV materials 
originate from Orbiter TPS (thermal protection system). 
2. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; rust 
is an SRB BSM exhaust residue; and salt is a natural 
landing site product. 
3. Earth compounds (muscovite, calcium-phosphorus, 
potassium-phosphorus materials) originate from the 
landing site. 
4. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method; results are pending. 
This detailed process is more difficult due to small 
sample quantity. Organic fibers originate from the 
sample cloth used for sampling. 
Body Flap Residue 
Results of the body flap residue analysis reveals the presence 
of the following materials: 
1. Tile, white tile coating, insulation, glass fiber, RTV 
2. Paint, rust, salt 
3. Earth compounds 
4. Organics and organic fibers 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Tile, white tile coating, insulation, glass fiber and 
RTV originate from the Orbiter TPS (thermal protection 
system. 
2. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; rust 
is an SRB BSM exhaust residue; and salt is a natural 
landing site product. 
3. Earth compounds (calcium-phosphorus, calcium-potassium, 
iron-silicon-calcium) originate from the landing site.
	 4 
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4. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method; results are pending. 
This detailed process is more difficult due to small 
sample quantity. Organic fibers originate from the 
sample cloth used for sampling. 
Orbiter Vent Door 
Results of the Orbiter vent door #9 sampling indicated the 
presence of the following materials: 
1. Metallics 
2. Tile, black and white tile coating, glass fibers, RTV 
3. Paint, dust, rust 
4. Organics 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Metallics (aluminum-alloy) are common to SRB BSM 
exhaust residue, but are not considered a debris 
concern in this quantity (micrometer) and have not 
demonstrated a known debris effect. 
2. Tile, black and white tile coating, glass fibers, and 
,	 RTV originate from the Orbiter TPS (thermal protection 
system). 
3. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; dust 
is of natural landing site origin; rust originates from 
SRB BSM exhaust. 
4. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method. This detailed method 
is more difficult due to small sample size. 
Conclusions 
The STS-49 mission sustained Orbiter tile damage to a lesser 
than average degree. The chemical analysis results from post 
flight samples did not provide data that points to a single 
source of damaging debris. 
Orbiter window samples exhibited evidence of SRB BSM exhaust, 
Orbiter TPS materials, landing site products, organics, and 
paint. 
The Orbiter wing RCC sample results provided indications of SRB 
ESM exhaust, thermal protection system (TPS) materials, landing 
site products, and paint.
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The Orbiter body flap residue sample results revealed evidence 
of Orbiter TPS materials, earth compounds, and paint. 
The samples from Orbiter vent door #9 indicated exposure to SRB 
BSM exhaust, TPS materials, and paint. 
Tabular formatting of the debris sample results as an aid in 
debris source identification was still under development at the 
time this report was released. This new type of debris 
analysis, i.e., repeatability of residual results (increase 
data populous) for identification of samples is designed to 
highlight trends.
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11.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris inspections and film review, there were no 
IFA candidates. 
11.1 LAUNR PAD/FACILITY 
1. No items. 
11.2 EXTERNAL TANK 
1. No items. 
11.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
1. HDP #4 DCS plunger was obstructed by frangible nut halves. 
11.4 ORBITER 
1. No items.
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary 
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June 30, 1992 
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-49 Final Report, and was completed June 
30, 1992. Publication numbers are LESC-30231 and JSC-25826. The actual document can 
be obtained through the LESC library/333-6594 or Christine Dailey /483-5336 of the NSTS 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project. 
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2.0	 Summary of the STS-49 FRF Film and Video 
Screening 
2.1	 Orange Discoloration in SSME #2 Exhaust Mach Diamond 
(Cameras E-002, E-020, E-062, E-063, E-076, E-077, OTV-151) 
Multiple (over sixty) orange discolorations were seen in the SSME #2 mach diamond 
during the engine test firing. The time period ranged from 15:11:57.343 to 15:12:11.735 
UTC as seen on camera E-002. The orange discolorations typically lasted about 0.01 
seconds. Figure 2.1 shows an example of the orange discoloration compared to the normal 
blue/white color of the SSME exhaust diamond. 
2.2	 Probable Tile Spacer Debris 
(Cameras E-017, E-023, E-024) 
A long, rectangular, red appearing object was seen coming from the base heat shield near 
the right OMS nozzle during the engine test firing. The object appeared to be a shim or 
spacer that came from between two tiles. Tile spacer debris was seen on previous missions 
STS-27R and STS-28R during SSME ignition. See figure 2.2. 
An almost identical appearing long, rectangular, red object was also seen coming from the 
base heat shield between SSME #1 and the left OMS nozzle on camera E-024. This second 
object also appeared to be a spacer coming from between two tiles. 
2.3	 Orange Flashes in SSME Exhaust Plume

(Camera E-002, E-003, E-020) 
A small orange flash was seen on the aft edge of SSME #1 exhaust plume near the mach 
diamond at 15:12:08.734 UTC. See figure 2.3. Orange flashes are often seen during 
SSME ignition prior to liftoff and have been attributed to small debris (ice Cr RCS paper) 
coming in contact with the hot exhaust gases. 
Two orange flashes were noted off the rim of SSME #2 during the engine firing that were 
simultaneous with discolorations seen in the SSME #2 mach diamond (described in section 
2.1) on camera E-020. 
2.4	 Base Heat Shield Deterioration 
(Cameras E-023, E-024) 
Tile surface material was seen to detach from a small area on the base heat shield at the base 
of the right OMS nozzle and fall aft as three separate pieces. See figure 2.4. A small area 
of base heat shield erosion was also noted at the base of the left OMS nozzle. Base heat 
shield erosion has been seen on previous missions from the camera E-023 and E-024 close-
up views. 
2.5	 Loose Left OMS Nozzle Cover Tape 
(Cameras E-020, E-024) 
A piece of tape was seen to detach from the left OMS nozzle cover after SSME start up. 
See figure 2.5. The OMS cover remained secure during the test firing and the loose tape 
did not appear to cause any problems. 
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Figure 2.1	 Orange Discoloration in SSME #2 Exhaust Mach 
Diamond 
The orange discoloration in the SSME #2 mach diamond contrasts 
against the normal blue/white mach diamond color as shown above. 
Multiple (over 60) orange discolorations were seen in the SSME #2 
mach diamond during the engine test firing. The orange 
discoloration typically lasted about 0.01 seconds. 
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Figure 2.2
	 Probable Tile Spacer Debris 
A long, rectangular, red appearing object (white arrow) was seen 
coming from the base heat shield near the right OMS nozzle during 
the engine test firing. The object appeared to be a tile shim that 
dislodged from between two tiles. The green arrow points to an 
area of base heat shield erosion that occurred during the engine 
firing.
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Figure 2.3	 Orange Flash in SSME Exhaust Plume 
A small orange flash was seen on the aft edge of SSME #1 exhaust 
plume at 15:12:08.734 UTC.
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Figure 2.4	 Base Heat Shield Deterioration 
A small area of base heat shield erosion (circled) formed at the base 
of the left OMS nozzle during the engine firing. A second area of 
base heat shield erosion near the right OMS nozzle can be seen in 
Figure 2.2.
.L 
131
Figure 2.5	 Loose Left OMS Nozzle Cover Tape 
A piece of tape was seen to detach from the left OMS nozzle cover 
after SSME start up. The OMS cover remained secure during the 
test firing, however.
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2.0	 Summary of the STS-49 FRF Film and Video 
Screening 
2.6	 Other Debris 
Debris normally seen during SSME start up coming from the ET/Orbiter LH2 and L02 
umbilical disconnects, ice from the SSME engine vent line nozzles, the TSM LH2 and L02 
T-O disconnects, and the ET GH2 umbilical vent line carrier were seen on many of the 
film/video views. See the individual film and video screening sheets in Appendix A for 
descriptions of the debris referenced by camera. None of the debris seen during the FRF 
film and video screenings were noted to cause damage due to impacts with Endeavour. 
Examples of some of the debris detailed in Appendix A are described below: 
A dark, rectangular shaped piece of debris appeared to fall from on or near the base of the 
right ROM ignitor and fall past SSME #3 during engine shut down on camera E-019. See 
figure 2.6 (A). 
A elongated flat piece of debris, dark on one side and light on the other, fell aft between 
SSME #2 and #3 after SSME ignition. A irregular  shaped object fell beneath SSME #1 
during engine shut down. These events were noted on cameras E-020 and E-023. See 
figure 2.6 (B). 
A long slender piece of dark debris was seen falling from behind the left RCS stinger near 
the time of engine start up on camera E-024. See figure 2.6 (C). A small piece of white 
debris noted coming from above SSME #2 appeared to come in contact with the SSME #2 
vent line. No damage was observed. A fast moving piece of debris was seen to fail aft 
from behind the left OMS nozzle. 
Multiple pieces of white debris (probably ice) were seen failing aft from the L02 TSM 
carrier disconnect at SSME ignition on camera E-017F. Multiple pieces of large irregular 
shaped dark debris were in the field of view at thesame time (possibly ice). Thedark 
debris appeared out of focus and very close to the camera. See figure 2.6 (D). A red 
elongated object was noted coming from behind SSME #3. 
A small piece of debris was seen falling near the rim of SSME #2 at 15:12:02.329 UTC on 
camera E-002. Small white debris was again noted falling aft of SSME #2 at 15:12:13.992 
UTC. 
Multiple pieces of small white debris were seen failing aft between SSMEs #1 and #3 
during the engine firing. See Appendix A screening sheet for camera E-003 for the UTC 
times. A single piece of small white debris was seen near the left wing trailing edge, fell aft 
along the LH2 TSM, and landed on the MLP (15:12:14.642 thru 15:12:14.883 UTC). 
Small white debris from the LH2 T-0 TSM disconnect area fell aft along the SSMEs at 
15:12:18.178 UTC. 
A small piece of white debris was seen moving beneath the vehicle, under the right wing, 
and then in front of the L02 TSM during the engine test firing on camera E-005. 
A small piece of white debris, first seen near the ET attach brace, moved toward the vehicle 
and then broke into two pieces on the camera E-013F view. The separate pieces then fell 
past the left elevon and exited the right side of the view. 
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Figure 2.6 (A)
	 Dark Debris Near Right ROFI Ignitor 
A dark, rectangular shaped piece of debris was seen to fall from on 
or near the base of the right ROFI ignitor and fall past SSME #3 
during engine shutdown. 
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Figure 2.6 (B)	 Debris Falling Aft of SSME #1 
A irregular shaped object fell beneath SSME #1 during engine 
shutdown.
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Figure 2.6 (C)	 Dark Debris Falling From Behind Left RCS Stinger 
A long slender piece of dark debris was seen falling from behind the 
left RCS stinger near the time of engine startup.
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Figure 2.6 .  (D)	 Debris From L02 TSM Carrier Disconnect 
Multiple pieces of white debris (probably ice) were seen falling aft 
from the L02 TSM carrier disconnect at SSME ignition. The dark, 
out of focus objects (that appear to be in the foreground) are also 
probably ice from the disconnect.
OGRAPH 
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2.0	 Summary of the STS-49 FRF Film and Video 
Screening 
2.7	 Other Events 
Other events noted during the FRF test firing include ET tip deflection (twang), the 
activation of the fire suppression water system, and birds in the field of view. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1	 Debris 
2.1.1	 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition 
2.1.1.1	 Umbilical Ice Debris 
(Cameras E-001, E-002, E-004, E-005, E-006, E-017, E-018, E-019, E-024, E-
026, E-031, E-033, E-034, E-050, E-065, E-076, E-077 and E-079) 
The amount of ice debris from the L02 and LH2 TSM T-O umbilicals and the ET/Orbiter umbilicals 
was noted as normal on the MLP cameras. No follow up action has been requested. 
2.1.2	 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition 
2.1.2.1	 SRB Hoiddown Post (HDP) Debris 
(Cameras EX-004, E-011 and E-012) 
On camera E-012, debris originated from the HDP M-5 shoe area. On camera EX-004, two pieces 
of dark debris (possibly epon shim or putty material as suggested by Rockwell-Downey) were 
noted between the SLY and HDP M-5 shoe at liftoff. A white tag was noted to the right of HDP 
M-7 at SSME ignition on camera E-01 1. No SRB holddown post stud hang ups were seen on any 
STS-49 mission films. No follow up action has been requested. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1.2.2	 Debris near Vertical Stabilizer 
(Cameras E-003 and E-020) 
Figure 2.1.2.2	 Debris near Vertical Stabilizer 
A single piece of debris (dark on one side, light on the other) appeared on the right side of the FOV 
near the vertical stabilizer and fell aft into the SSME plume at liftoff. This debris is shown in 
figure 2.1.2.2. The event was shown to the TPS subsystem manager. No follow up action has 
been requested. 
2.1.2.3	 Flame Duct Debris 
(Task #7) 
(Cameras E-007, E-008, E-009, E-010, E-011, E-012, E-014 and E-062) 
Since all the flame duct debris pieces were very small and the trajectories of these objects were very 
short or very difficult to see, Task #7, Velocity Measurements of SRB Duct Debris will not be 
performed this mission. (See Section 6.0, Appendix D.) 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2. 1 .3	 Debris after Liftoff 
(Cameras E-005, E-006, E-025, E-031, E-052, E-054, E-077, E-079, and 
OTV-109) 
2.1.3.1	 Tumbling Debris seen on Underside of Orbiter 
(Task #16) 
(Cameras E-052, E-054, and E-079) 
S
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Figure 2.1.3.1
	
Tumbling Debris Seen on Underside of Orbiter 
A tumbling piece of debris (dark on one side, light on the other), first noted on the underside of the 
Orbiter at mid-fuselage, fell aft during tower clear. This debris is depicted in figures 2.1.3. 1. The 
distance from the tip of the Orbiter nose to the position that the debris was first seen was measured 
to be 36.3 feet (or 74.5 feet above the Orbiter umbilical area). This means that the debris source 
would have to have been at this position or further forward along the Orbiter x-axis. The actual 
source could not be determined visually from either cameras E-052 or E-054. (The L02 feedline 
on the ET or the ET/Orbiter forward attach are both possible debris sources for this event as 
reported verbally by KSC. See Section 6.0, Appendix D, Task #16, Determine source of Debris 
on Underside of Orbiter at Mid Fuselage.) 
A white piece of debris was on seen on camera E-079 moving from left to right across the ET L02 
feedline and then falling aft along the L02 feed line at liftoff. This event was reviewed with a JSC 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
engineer and it was concluded that the debris was unlikely to be a piece of Orbiter tile. Also the 
post landing debris assessment report did not indicate a potential tile source for this debris. 
Figure 2.1.3.2	 Rectangular Piece of Debris from Above L02 Umbilical 
Area 
(Task #13) 
(Cameras E-005, E-006, and E-025) 
Figure 2.1.3.2	 Rectangular Piece of Debris from Above L02 Umbilical 
Area 
A light, medium-sized piece of rectangular debris along with two other pieces of debris were seen 
originating from above and outboard of the L02 umbilicals on cameras E-005, E-006 and E-025. 
See figure 2.1.3.2. This debris fell aft past the right inboard elevon at liftoff. Analysis indicated 
that the debris was probably ice from the L02 feedline on the external tank. See Section 6.0, 
Appendix D, Task #13, Rectangular Debris Characterization. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
Figure 2.1.3.3	 Two White Pieces of Debris in front of Right Outboard 
Elevon 
(Camera E4)77) 
Figure 2.1.3.3	 Two White Pieces of Debris in front of Right Outboard 
Elevon 
Two small pieces of white debris were seen falling aft of the edge of the right inboard elevon at 
liftoff on camera E-077 as seen in figure 2.1.3.3. No follow up action has been requested. 
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Figure 2.1.3.4	 Debris from above LH2 Umbilical and from Aft Strut 
(Cameras E-031 and OTV-109) 
Figure 2.1.3.4	 Debris from above LH2 Umbilical (top circle); Debris 
from Aft Strtut (lower circle). 
White debris (possibly ice) originated from the the ET side of the aft attach strut and fell toward the 
pad at liftoff as seen on OTY-109 and E-031. See figure 2.1.3.4. 
Debris falling aft of the SLY after liftoff was similar to that seen on previous mission's film and 
videos. The timing of selected debris events is presented in Section 6.0, Appendix C, STS-49 
Timing Data Report. 
None of the debris described above was seen to strike the launch vehicle. No further analysis has 
been requested. 
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2.2	 MLP Events 
2.2.1	 Base Heat Shield Flexing 
(Cameras E-019, E-020, E-076 and E-077) 
Flexing (characterized by an up and down motion) was noted in the base heat shield from cameras 
E076, E-077, E-019, and E-020. The flexing occurred at approximately T -4.6 seconds and ended 
just after all SSMEs had finished starting up at about T -2.9 seconds MET. Note that the flexing 
in the base heat shield was seen in the area between the SSMEs. 
In order to see if the base heat shield flexing as seen on STS-49 was unique to OV- 105, previous 
missions were screened. Base heat shield flexing was detected on STS-51J (first flight of OV-
104), STS-33, STS-48, STS-45, and STS-49 FRF. According to KSC, base heat shield flexing 
was also observed on the STS-1 FRF (SSME test firing for first flight of OV-102), STS-6 (FRF1 
and FRF2) and STS-6 (first flight of OV-099), STS-14 (slightly evident), and STS-28 FRF. 
According to Rockwell - Downey base heat shield flexing was also seen on STS-41D, STS-51F, 
and STS-51J FRF. 
Since base heat shield flexing has been seen on previous vehicles it is not unique to OV-105 and 
may be a normal occurrence. 
An analysis was conducted to measure the amount of up an down motion exhibited in the base heat 
shield flexing by using film from camera E-076. Three separate analysts determined distances 
from a point on the base heat shield to a control point on the base of the vertical stabilizer over the 
same 200 frames for which maximum base heat shield movement was observed. The average of 
the distances from the three analysts was then used to determine the best estimate of the "true" 
distance for each frame. The distances between successive extreme points were measured and the 
maximum peak to peak displacement was found to be 1.06 inches with a 95% confidence range of 
between .24 to 1.88 inches. Note that the overall distance between the base heat shield and the 
point on the vertical stabilizer increases about 2 inches over the last one second and this is thought 
to be due to the twang caused by SSME start-up. 
The frequencies of the oscillations seen in the base heat shield flexing were measured and two high 
frequency peaks were detected at 25 Hz. and 41 Hz. 
The displacement of a point on the base heat shield was also measured with respect to the X and Y 
axes of the camera (note that the Y axis of the camera is essentially the same as the Orbiter's X axis 
and the X axis of the camera is at a 30 degree angle to the orbiter's Y axis). The maximum peak to 
peak displacements are approximately 1.3 inches for each axis with a 95% confidence interval for 
the Y displacement of between 0.4 and 2.3 inches and for the X displacement the 95% confidence 
interval is between 0.3 and 2.2 inches. 
MSFC conducted an analysis of the base heat shield flexing and found that the maximum 
displacement in the Orbiter X and Y axes was approximately one inch. The MSFC preliminary 
report is included in Section 6.0, Appendix D, Task #14, Characterize Base Heat Shield Motion at 
SSME start-up. 
A frequency analysis was conducted on the X and Y displacements and no dominant high 
frequencies were detected, implying that the base heat shield flexing is occurring randomly. This 
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result contradicts the finding of apparently strong peaks using the control point to base heat shield 
distance data. Since the distance data incorporates both X and Y displacements, it could be 
showing that peaks in the X and Y combine to create stronger peaks in the distance data. 
MSFC also conducted a frequency analysis and found no dominant frequencies. MSFC concluded 
that the flexing was essentially random. 
2.2.2	 Base Heat Erosion 
(Cameras E-019, E-023 and E-024) 
Figure 2.2.2	 Base Heat Shield Deteoration on the Base of the Right RSC 
Stinger 
Base heat shield erosion (three chips) were noted on cameras E-019, E-023 and E-024 on the right 
RCS stinger and at least seven small chips were noted on the base heat shield and left RCS stinger 
base at SSME start up as seen in figure 2.2.2. No further analysis has been requested. 
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2.2.3	 Orange Vapor (Possible Free Burning Hydrogen) (Cameras OTV-170, E-001, E-002, E-003, E-005, E-016, E-018, E-019, E-020, 
E-036 and E-077) 
Orange vapor (possibly free-burning hydrogen) was seen to rise toward the base of the vertical 
stabilizer just prior to SSME ignition. This vapor appeared to be similar to other missions with 
winds from the north. No further analysis has been requested. 
2.2.4	 Flashes in SSME Plumes 
(Cameras E-003 and E-005) 
Multiple flashes were seen in the SSME #1, #2 and #3 exhaust plumes after SSME start-up while 
the vehicle was still on the pad. These flashes have been seen on previous missions. No further 
analysis has been requested. 
2.3	 Ascent Events 
2.3.1	 White Spot on Underside of Orbiter TPS at Liftoff 
(Camera E-034) 
Figure 2.3.1	 White Spot on Underside of Orbiter TPS at Liftoff 
A white spot was noted on the underside of the Orbiter (approximately at mid-fuselage on the right 
side) at liftoff and appeared to be on the Orbiter TPS. See figure 2.3.1. This white spot was not 
seen from any other launch views. Inspections of the Orbiter after landing did not show the spot. 
No further analysis has been requested. 
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2.3.2	 Brightening in SRB Plume 
(Cameras ET-212 and E-204) 
A small area near the upper right corner of the SRB plume appeared to brighten intermittently 
between 45 and 87 seconds MET. This was noted on camera ET-212. 
Figure 2.3.2	 Bright Orange Area in SRB Plume 
A bright orange area was observed at 121 seconds MET in the SRB plume several vehicle lengths 
below the vehicle as seen in figure 2.3.2. This bright area may have been the result of slag at 
tailoff prior to SRB separation. 
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2.3.3	 Flares in SSME Plume 
(Task #12) 
(Cameras KTV-5, E-208, E-212, E-218, and E-220) 
2.3.3	 Orange Discoloration in SSME Plume 
Up to five separate flares were seen in the SSME exhaust plume after liftoff on the long range 
trackers including a single flare that was noted on camera ET-212 near the SSME #1 plume at 48 
seconds MET. Flares during this time period have been seen on several earlier missions and no 
further analysis has been requested. 
Twenty-six orange discolorations (possibly flares) were noted in the SSME plumes beginning at 
84 seconds MET (See Section 6.0, Appendix D, Task #12, Flare in SSME plume starting at 84 
seconds MET.) and continuing through SRB separation. Figure 2.3.3 is an example of one of the 
twenty-six orange discolorations. This event occurred at 118.7 seconds MET. The first of these 
orange discolorations coincided with a large increase in the SSME #2 high pressure fuel pump 
temperature reported by the MER. (It was later reported by the MER that this high pressure report 
was a sensor failure, not an actual high temperature condition.) Nornml recirculation seen on 
camera ET-212 between 91 and 106 seconds MET was compared to the events seen on KTV-5. 
Since STS-33 was also launched from Pad 39B at a similar inclination angle and launch time, 
KTV-5 was reviewed for similar discolorations and did not show the same flare event; however 
color distortions were present on STS-33 KTV-5 view of the SLV at about the same viewing 
angles. 
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The STS-49 D2 tape of KTV-5 was screened at the JSC Imagery Operations Office/JL5 in order to 
get a better view of the discolorations in slow motion. JL5 reported that camera KTV-5 had a four 
line vertical jitter that was introduced at the time of recording at launch and it was impossible to 
remove. The view of the sensor "lag" on the D2 was very apparent. It is believed that the 
discoloration events were, at a minimum, exaggerated by the sensor lag making them appear so 
distinctive. Similar discolorations were not seen on other cameras. The conclusion was that the 
discolorations on KTY-5 were due to vertical jitter. No further analysis was requested. 
2.3.4	 Body Flap Motion 
(Cameras E-17, E-212 and E-220) 
Slight body flap motion was seen on camera E-017 prior to liftoff. Slight body flap motion was 
also seen on camera films E-212 and E-220 after liftoff. Body flap motion has been seen on 
previous mission films and the magnitude of the body flap motion seen on the STS-49 views was 
not sufficient to warrant further analysis. See Section 6.0, Appendix D, Task #4, Body Flap 
Analysis. 
2.3.5	 Recirculation 
(Task #1) 
(Cameras ET-212, E-204, E-212 and E-218) 
Recirculation prior to SRB separation was seen on long range cameras ET-212, E-204, E-212 and 
E-218. The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLY prior to SRB 
separation has been seen on nearly all of the previous missions. For STS-49, the start of 
recirculation was observed at about 93 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 110 
seconds MET on Camera E-212. Timing data for recirculation for STS-49 is presented below and 
a summary of recirculation for previous missions is presented in Section 6.0, Appendix D, Task 
#1, Recirculation Characterization. No further analysis has been requested. 
Cameras on which recirculation was observed for STS-49 
CAMERA	 START (seconds MET)	 STOP (seconds MET) 
ET-212	 91	 106 
E-204 
*E.212	 93	 110 
E-218	 93	 101 
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION 
NOTE:	 Intermittent LOV of the area due to the exhaust plumes prevented 
acquisition of specific start and stop times for recirculation on 
camera E-204 
2.3.6	 Linear Optical Effect 
(Camera E-205 and E-212) 
On cameras E-205 and E-212, linear optical distortions were noted at 57 and 60 seconds MET. The 
time of occurrence of these and other events during ascent are presented in Section 6.0, Appendix 
C. STS-49 Timing Data Report. Linear optical effects have been seen on previous missions. No 
follow up action has been requested. 
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2.3.7	 SRB and ET Separation 
(Camera UMBLI) 
Figure 2.3.7	 Shallow Divot on ET Base TPS and White Linear Smear 
on Optical Plate 
A shallow divot on the ET base TPS near the left SRB attach and chipping of the LH2 electrical 
cable tray were noted on camera UMBL1. Also a white linear smear on the optical plate appears 
from left center to lower center of the FOV before SRB separation as seen on figure 2.3.7. 
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2.4	 On Orbit 
2.4.1	 Analysis of Onboard Photography of the ET (DTO-0312) 
Due to the lighting conditions and the attitude of the Orbiter, no attempt was made by the STS-49 
crew to acquire photography of the external tank after separation. (See Section 6.0, Appendix D, 
Task #6, ET Onboard Hassleblad Photo Analysis.) 
2.4.2	 Electronic Still Camera 
Figure 2.4.2 (A)	 Enhanced ESC Downlinked Image of INTELSAT 
ORIGINAL PAGE
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Figure 2.4.2 (B)	 Enhanced ESC Downlinked Image of INTELSAT 
Electronic still camera (ES C) downlinked images from Endeavour of the INTELSAT prior to 
capture were enlarged, enhanced, and examined for sharp edges. No sharp edges that could have 
affected the astronauts retrieval of the satellite were noted. Figure 2.4.2 (A) is a histogram 
equilization of one image of INTELSAT and figure 2.4.2 (B) is an intensity mapping plus 90 
degrees rotation of another ESC image. (See Section 6.0, Appendix D, Task #15, INTEL Satellite 
Enhancements.) 
2.4.3	 Assembly of Space Station by EVA Methods (ASEM) 
(Task #11) 
The Assembly of Structures by EVA Methods (ASEM) was performed during STS-49. Due to the 
additional space walks required to retrieve and repair [NTELSAT, ASEM procedures were 
substantially reduced. PTAP personnel screened these activities in real-time to gather information 
for future analysis and to serve as support in case of a contingency. However, less than ten 
percent of the crew's EVA activities were downlinked live. Two video feeds were continuously 
recorded on the Orbiter during the course of these activities and they will be screened at a later date 
to help determine positions and rates of the RMS arm, assembly structures and crew propulsion 
devices. 
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Two preliminary findings from the initial screening were: difficulty identifying the astronauts if 
they were more than 30 feet away from the camera (the id bands on the suits were not easily 
discernable) and a general problem with audio quality (with higher frequency voices become harder 
to understand.) Detailed notes on the initial screening can be found in Section 6.0, Appendix D, 
Task #11, ASEM Evaluation. 
2.4.4	 Orbital Debris Impact on Window WI 
Figure 2.4.4	 Orbital Debris Impact on Window WI 
An orbital debris impact was noted by the STS49 crew on flight day 8 in the upper right hand 
corner of window Wi as viewed from the commander's seat. The size of the dark star burst was 
described as the size of a 50 cent piece. The photograph displayed in figure 2.4.4 was made 
during the post-landing inspection and shows a white material covering the window that is the 
residual fro SRB separation motors. Commander Brandenstein suggested that the dark star burst 
is due to the cleaning(removal) of the SRB plume residual by the debris impact. An estimate has 
been made that the strike occurred one inch from the edge of the window and the center of the star 
burst is approximately 1/16 to 1/32 of a inch in size. 
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2.5	 Landing Event 
2.5.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis 
2.5.1.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film 
Camera E-1008 film was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear and the nose gear. The vertical 
stabilizer was used as a scale. Data was gathered from approximately 1 second prior to landing through 
touchdown. Four points on every other frame over a period of 100 frames were digitized. These points 
consisted of the bottom of the left main gear, a point on the runway immediately below the wheel and the 
top and bottom of the vertical stabilizer (as a scaling reference). The raw data was corrected for the vertical 
change in scale at each frame. The distance between the bottom of the wheel and the runway was 
computed and a linear regression was applied on this normalized vertical distance vs. time data to 
determine the actual sink rate. This rate was determined to be 2.0 ft/sec. 
Nose gear touchdown occurred 11 seconds after main gear touchdown. Again, data was gathered for 
approximately 1 second just prior to nose gear touchdown. Three points on every other frame over a 
period of 96 frames were digitized (also from Camera E-1008). These points consisted of the top and 
bottom of the right nose gear wheel (as a scaling reference) and a point on the runway immediately below 
the wheel. The raw data was corrected for the vertical change in scale at each frame. A linear regression 
was performed on this normalized vertical distance vs. time data. The slope of this line was used as the 
sink rate of the nose gear and found to be 2.8 ft/sec. Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in 
Section 6.0, Appendix D, Task #3, Determine Sink Rate from Video/Film. 
2.5.1.2	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video 
Data from TV-4 was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear and the nose gear. A vertical 
section of tile of known length on the right side of the Orbiter was used as a reference scale. The 
vertical position of the main gear was found by taking the difference between the raw vertical 
positions of the main landing gear and the edge of the runway with the same X coordinate over a 
one second period. Using the scale calculated from the known vertical reference, these differences 
were converted to feet. The same method was used to determine the vertical position of the nose 
gear. A least squares regression line was calculated from the data and the slope was used as the 
average sink rate. The sink rate for the main gear was determined to be 1.08 feet per second and 
2.81 for the nose gear. Graphics depicting the above data may be found in Section 6.0, Appendix 
D, Task #3,-Determine Sink Rate from Video/Film. 
2.5.2	 Drag Chute 
2.5.2.1	 Uplock Shear Pin 
(Task #9) 
PTAP analysts were requested to attempt to determine if the appropriate shear pin was used during 
installation of the drag chute into the Endeavour using the assembly video tapes. After carefully 
screening the tapes for scenes which displayed the shear pin, it was determined that there was 
insufficient information due to shadows and video resolution in the video tapes to make the 
determination requested. See Section 6.0, Appendix D, Task #9, Uplock Shear Pin Identification. 
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2.5.2.2	 Drag Chute Performance 
(Task #10)
U
-	 All  - 
Figure 2.5.2.2	 Chute Inflated in Reefed Configuration 
Figure 2.5.2.2 depicts just one of many stages of the drag chute deployment. The various stages 
are drag chute initiation, pilot chute inflation, bag release, chute inflation in reefed configuration, 
disreefmg initiation, full chute inflation and chute release. The analysis of the drag chute 
deployment and its effect upon the vehicle is still being performed as of the writing of this report 
and a separate report will be generated describing the results of this analysis upon completion. 
See Section 6.0, Appendix D, Task #10, Drag Chute Performance Analysis. 
2.5.3	 Post-Landing Inspection of Damage to the Orbiter 
Although the launch and landing films indicated that STS-49 was an unusually clean mission, 
eleven hits greater than one inch were found by KSC on the Orbiter during the post-landing 
inspection. Several of these hits included TPS damage on the right side of the Orbiter nose and the 
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base heat shield. A small segment of the aft port payload bay door seal appeared misaligned. 
Streaks were noted on the TPS forward of the hydrogen umbilical. 
2.5.4	 Post-Landing Inspection of Debris Found on Runway 
A half inch screw and a small green cylindrical object were seen on the ground during the post-
landing inspection. 
2.6	 Other Normal Events 
Other normal events observed included: normal pad debris; SRB flame duct debris; RCS paper 
debris; white debris (probably ice) from the ET/Orbiter, TSM umbilical areas and the GUCP 
disconnect during liftoff; left inboard elevon motion was noted during liftoff; ET aft dome out-
gassing and charring; vapor off SRB stiffener rings; condensation vapor trails off both wings after 
tower clear; white flashes in the SSME plume throughout the roll maneuver, indication of wind 
shear in the SRB plume; atmospheric bow waves; SRB exhaust plume brightening at tail off; and 
slag noted after SRB separation. No further analysis has been requested for any of these events. 
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I.	 INTRODUCTION 
Space Shuttle Mission STS-49, the first flight of the 
Orbiter Endeavour, was conducted May 7, 1992 at approximately 
6:40 P.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B), 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive photographic and 
video coverage was provided and has been evaluated to determine 
proper operation of the ground and flight hardware. Cameras 
(video and cine) providing this coverage are located on the fixed 
service structure (FSS), mobile launch platform (MLP), LC-39B 
perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and downrange tracking 
sites. 
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES: 
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis 
objectives for STS-49 included, but were not limited to the 
following.. 
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for 
anomaly detection 
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems 
C. Determination of SRB PlC firing time and. SRB 
separation time 
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
integrity 
e. Correct operation of the following: 
1. Hoiddown post blast covers 
2. SSME ignition 
3. LH2 and L02 17" disconnects 
4. GH2 umbilical 
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals 
6. Free hydrogen ignitors 
7. Vehicle clearances 
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back 
9. Vehicle motion 
There was one special test objectives for this mission. 
a. SRB hoiddown post shoe rotation quantification 
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT: 
Film was received from sixty of sixty-three requested 
cameras as well as video from twenty-three of twenty-three 
requested cameras. The following table illustrates the camera 
data received at MSFC for STS-49. 
162
CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-49 
16mm 35mm Video 
MLP 28 0 3 
FSS 7 0 3 
Perimeter 3 5 6 
Tracking 0 16 11 
Onboard 1 0 0
Totals	 39	 21	 23 
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is 
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed assessments 
of the video products received at MSFC. 
a. Ground Camera Coverage: 
Photographic coverage of STS-49 ranged from good to poor. 
Most cameras on this mission experienced dark exposures due to a 
forty minute hold during the evening twilight. Coverage from 
the trackers was limited due to cloud coverage. Camera E-12 
experienced a timing problem. The timing resets to zero and 
continues to stay there throughout liftoff. Camera E-54 
experienced some camera jitter, and on camera E-211, processing 
scratches were noted. The shoe targets on post M-1 and 14-5 were 
not totally visible from camera EX-1 and EX-4, respectively. 
b. Onboard Camera Assessment: 
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the 
main parachute deployment. Both cameras experienced some 
problems. For camera E-301 onboard the right SRB, the film was 
not exposed. For camera E-302 onboard the left SRB, the film 
broke at the start of rewinding. One 16mm camera and one 35mm 
were flown to record SRB and ET separations. The 16mm provided 
coverage of the left SRB separation only. All other onboard film 
was under-exposed due to low light levels and provided no data. 
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS: 
a. General Observations: 
While viewing the film, several events were noted which 
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and 
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the 
SSME plume; and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle 
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during ascent, which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire 
detectors, purge barrier material and SRB thermal curtain tape. 
b. Plume Flares in Video Signal: 
Apparent orange flashes were noted in the SSME plumes 
during ascent as seen from video camera TV-5 at 128:23:42:58.697 
UTC, (figure one). These flashes were not evident on the film or 
any other video camera. Camera TV-5 is a tube type video camera 
which is subject to blurring images when the camera is moved. 
The flashes are a blurring of the SSME plume. 
c. Base Heat Shield Motion: 
During SSME start transient, the base heat shield exhibited 
an axial movement at the center of the engine cluster. The 
movement was intermittent and oscillatory. The motion ceased 
after the SSMEs reached mainstage. A historical review was 
conducted to determine if similar motion was evident on other 
orbiters. Axial base heat shield motion was observed on all of 
the other orbiters. A summary of the research findings is 
presented in Table IV.1. 
BASE HEAT SHIELD MOVEMENT COMPARISON

TABLE IV.i 
ORBITER	 MISSION	 CAMERA	 COMMENTS 
Columbia	 STS-1	 E-19	 No flexing of the base heat 
.shield was noted - good 
view of heat shield 
Columbia	 STS-30	 E-19	 Flexing of the base heat 
shield was observed 
Columbia	 STS-32	 E-19	 Flexing of the base heat 
shield was observed 
Columbia	 STS-40	 E-19	 No flexing of the base heat 
shield was noted - good view 
of heat shield 
E-20	 Inconclusive due to camera 
vibration 
Challenger	 STS-6 FRF
	 E-20	 Flexing of the base heat 
shield was observed 
Challenger	 STS-6	 E-19	 Flexing of the base heat 
shield was observed - good 
view of heat shield 
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Challenger
	
STS-11	 E-19	 Flexing of the base heat 
shield was observed 
Discovery	 STS-14	 E-19	 Motion noted in eyelid 
blanket only - good view of 
heat shield 
Discovery	 STS-26 FRF E-19
	 Flexing of the base heat 
shield was observed - good 
view of heat shield 
Discovery	 STS-48	 E-19	 No flexing of the base heat 
shield was noted - good view 
of heat shield 
Atlantis	 STS-28	 E-19	 Flexing of the base heat 
shield was observed - good 
view of heat shield 
Atlantis	 STS-44	 E-19	 No flexing of the base heat 
shield was noted - good view 
of heat shield 
Atlantis	 STS-51J FRF E-19
	 Inconclusive due to 
camera vibration 
Endeavour	 STS-49 FRF E-19
	 Flexing of the base heat 
shield was observed 
Endeavour	 STS-49 FRF E-20
	 Flexing of the base heat 
shield was observed 
A motion analysis of the base heat shield motion was 
conducted in order to possibly determine frequency and amplitude. 
Figure two shows the area that was measured using cameras E-19 
and E-76. The X0 and Y0 (Orbiter axis X and Y.) data are shown in 
figures three and four. The data from camera E-19 were taken 
using a reference point on the TSM to measure displacement. 
Camera E-76 data were a result of displacement relative to the 
camera optics. 
Due to the digitization noise created by the large scale 
factors, a frequency could not be calculated. However, during 
the oscillation, the base heat shield deflected approximately 1.0 
inch in the -X, direction. 
The following chart provides the RNS data accuracy using 
data points taken prior to visible motion of each camera. 
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CAMERA	 HORIZONTAL	 VERTICAL 
	
E-19	 +0.150	 +0.134 
	
-0.135	 -0.162 
	
E-76	 +0.216	 +0.167 
	
-0.188	 -0.150 
V.	 ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS: 
a. T-Zero Times: 
T-Zero times were determined from cameras which view the 
SRB hoiddown posts numbers M-1 and M-2. These cameras record the 
explosive bolt combustion products. 
POST	 CAMERA POSITION	 TIME (UTC) 
N-i	 E-9	 128:23:40:00.028 
14-2	 E-8	 128:23:40:00.027 
b. ET . Tip Deflection: 
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined 
to be approximately 31.9 inches. Figure five is a data plot 
showing the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal 
and vertical directions. These data were derived from camera 
E-79.
c. SRB Separation Time: 
SRB separation time for STS-49 was determined to be 
128:23:42:07.25 UTC taken from camera E-212. 
d. SRB Hoiddown Post Shoe Rotation Study: 
A study was performed on this mission to determine the aft 
skirt/shoe rotation effects at T-Zero due to the radial biasing 
of the MLP holddown post to 0.060 inches. 
Cameras EX1, EX4, E-27 and E-28 were used to provide close-
in coverage of the shoes and hoiddown posts 14-1, M-5, 14-3 and 
M-7, respectively. However, due to improper camera orientation, 
rotation data could not be gathered for hoiddown posts M-5 and 
M-7.
Figure six shows the locations of the cameras and hoiddown 
posts and direction of "horizontal motion" relative to the 
attached plots.
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Figures seven and eight show the target positions of the 
motion data taken relative to a stationary target on the MLP. 
Figure seven represents post M-l. Figure eight represents post 
M-3.
The following table provides the RMS data accuracy for each 
post measured in inches. 
Post	 Horizontal Vertical 
M-].	 +.015 +.013 
-.018
-.015 
M-3	 +.018 +.018 
-.018 -.021
The motion data are presented in figures nine through 
fourteen. These data have been filtered to remove the noise from 
the interactive digitization process. 
167 
,-.	
4r	 I 
iI
	
Sir 
1	 -
- 
r' rm 
•	
.•.- 4 
	
-I	
-.	 .• 
•
S
•	 .. 
0 • •

S
S 
4
TT II r TTFTTTTrTTTTT1 
I [FEb	 E,arIc5
(
ML 1115 
U, 
LJ 
I 
U 
I-
U 
1 
U,
I
1.5 
a
U, 
U 
I 
LLJ 
U
0 U 
1 
U,
a 
.4
B1SE HEkT SHIELD 1IJTIOH 
JER45 E!
-!-fi-3
—'o E-lY 
Xo E 76 
Figure 3 
----io E - I 
- o E-?6 
• bH 3L rLH I JhLL L I IIIIII][ 
JirERF5 E -i g
 a E-76 
i	 11,11	 liii	 liI(	 iiii	 I	 I liii 
4 -1	
- 3.5	 —3M	 —a.s 
I 1 1 E
rc 
( T' 
169	 ORIGINAL FACE 
Figure 4
	 COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
If)
It, 
F- H-
Lfl U) 
;< )-
IU 
ru 
m 
0)
LI
	
(U	 L
H 
UJ 
Lfl 
II 
F-
0) 
N-(-a 
0) 
If)	
- I	
I I I I	 I	 I 111 11 ITT r
-	 ' 
K)	 LSD	 El 
II j
H J 'i	 OR1O!NAL PAGE 
170
	 Figure 5	 CCLTh 
>-. 
+ 
N')	 T
x 
)
N 
N 
uJ
N 
+ 
N 
cD
	
LU 
N 
w
	
>-
 
Figure 6 - 
Camera Locations	 171
-	 - 
3	 __ 
-	
- 
4. .-
..th	 T.U.I. 
maim RIM 
MW
Figure 7
OG!NAL RAGE 
172	 COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
BOTTOM SHOE 
OUTBOARD SHOE 
OUTBOARD POST 
INBO1IRD SHOE 
I-_	 QXNf9 
( 
11J I
Dw
—BOTTOM SHOE 
-- - OUTBOAR[ SHOE 
— OUTBOARD POST 
— INBOARD POST 
INBOARD SHOE 
r-ç	 1!1fR1r1 
iIR1C 
0-I 
U 
I 
U 
Z:
STS	 HOt [[OW POST Ii I 'Jt-1OE 5J IRT I IOTIOtl 
HORIOIIIAL tTIOH
-0.2	 -o 1	 0.0	 0.'
	
rim
SECONDS RELATI€ TO 1 0
F	 () 
NOR t:UMTAL I UTIOII
-,	 I	 0.	 0	 I 
-lill; REI kTI € 10 1 0 
173
4. 
Figure 10	 ORIGINAL PAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
-------BJTfOH SHOE 
-	 OL' TBOR[ SHOE 
-OUTBO[ POST 
- FIBOPPE , POST 
1€flR[	 H'iW
ç 
/ 515 
uj 
I
Figute 12
II	
-
174
ORIGINP1L PAGE

COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
w 
I
H IJL[[Q I.Jl P']T II	 Ht 	 I'IR1	 lii I I'JH 
'ERTV-L 11Jr1011 
'
-eLi	 00	 01 
E-UIlP F'ELTI' € TO T 0
flTfIJH 5-1tJE 
O'i thO-RE SHOE 
-i1I.!TB ! Th-R{ P'.JS T 
III5Lh-R[ 'SHOE 
I F- P { I-i L IiJ 11011
—BOTTOM SHOE 
OUTBOARD SHOE 
—OUTBOARD POET 
—INBOARD SHOE 
/	 rc I1QIttRTh3 
( 
u-I 
LU 
I 
U 
z
STS-49 HOLDDOU'l POST M-1 SHOE'SKIRT MOTION 
LETICIL MOTION
S
	
S	 11	 a 
SECONDS RELRTIUE TO T-S
F	 I 
L)ERTICL t-UTION 
u-I 
LU 
I 
U 
z
—BOTTOM SHOE 
----OUTBOARD SHOE 
OUTBOARD POET 
--INBOARD POET 
---INBOARD SHOE
ORIGINAL PAGE

COLOR PHOTOGRAPH 
13	 11	 a 
SECONDS RELITIL€ TO T-
175
Figure 14
5F	 NCa1IR1II 
t rIc
Appendix C. Rockwell Photographic Analysis Summary 
176
Space Transportation Systems Division 
Rockwell international Corporation 
12214 Lakewood Boulevard
Downey, California 90241 
June 16, 1992
rim 
Rockwell 
International 
In Reply Refer to 92MA2832 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA) 
Contract NAS9-1 8500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell 
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-49 Mission. 
The System Integration Contractor hereby submits the Engineering 
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle 
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document 
(NSTS 08244). 
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated 
to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) 
providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39B Fixed Service 
Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and 
uprange and downrange tracking sites for the STS-49 launch conducted on 
May 7, 1992, at approximately 4:40 pm (PDT) from the Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) and for the landing on May 16, 1992 at Edwards Airforce Base (1:58 pm 
PDT) 
Rockwell received launch films from 85 cameras (62 cine, 23 video) and landing 
films from 15 cameras (7 cine, 8 video) to support the STS-49 photographic 
evaluation effort. 
All ground camera coverage for this mission including coverage on the MLP, 
FSS and tracking cameras were good. However, due to the accumulation of 
clouds, many of the tracking video and films reviewed were obstructed after the 
vehicle went through the cloud cover. This hampered analysis and possible 
detection of debris and/or anomalies. 
Overall, the films showed STS-49 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from 
the ET/ORB umbilicals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to 
the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual 
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB 
stiffener rings and dissipated after the completion of the roll maneuver. No 
vapor was observed in the vicinity of the rudder/speed brake at liftoff. Charring 
of the ET aft dome and recirculation were visible and normal. Booster 
Separation Motor (BSM) firing and SRB separation also appeared to be normal. 
(Packing Sheet No. DM92-15279) 
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Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge 
water was activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were 
activated at approximately 1 second Missions Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. 
There were no SRB holddown support post bolt hang-ups, and all blast deflection 
shields closed prior to direct SRB exhaust plume impingement. Both TSM 
umbilicals released and retracted as designed. The ET GH2 vent line carrier 
dropped normally and latched securely with no rebound. No anomalies were 
identified with the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical hydrogen dispersal system hardware. 
STS-49 was the-seventh flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB 
hoiddown support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The link is 
designed to increase the plunger velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving the 
hoiddown bolt ejection velocity unchanged. This prevents frangible nut 
fragments and/or NSI cartridges from falling from the DCS, while not 
increasing the probability of a holddown bolt hang-up. 
One major or significant event was identified by the film review team at KSC. 
During the film review the team observed an apparent movement of the Orbiter 
base heat shield between the SSME's during SSME start-up. This movement 
appeared to subside as the SSME plumes stabilized. This event and other events 
noted by the Rockwell film/video users during the review and analysis of the 
STS-49 photographic items are summarized in the following comments. These 
events are not considered to be a constraint to next flight. 
COMMENTS 
1. Flexing (an up and down motion) was noted in the base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster from cameras E19, E20, E76, and 
E77. The flexing occurred at approximately T-4.5 seconds and ended after 
all SSME's had started up at about T-3.0 seconds MET. In order to 
determine if the base heat shield flexing seen on STS-49 was unique to OV-
105, films from previous flights and Flight Readiness Firing (FRF) tests 
were screened. Base heat shield movement was observed on STS-1 (OV-102), 
STS-6, STS-51F (OV-099), STS-41D, STS-48, STS-42 (OV-103) and STS-51J, 
STS-44, STS-45 (OV-104). In addition, motion was observed on STS-11, STS-
32 STS-35, STS-40 by MSFC and STS-14, STS-28 by KSC. 
Since flexing by the base heat shield has been seen on previous missions it is 
not unique to OV-105 and may be a normal occurrence.A hypothesis is that 
the motion is caused by pressure waves from the main engines during 
ignition. 
An analysis has been conducted by JSC and MSFC to measure the 
displacement and frequency of the base heat shield up and down motion. 
Details of the base heat shield flexing study are available in the JSC and 
MSFC reports. No additional action(s) are currently planned. 
2. On cameras OTV-170, E-1, E-2, E-3, E-, E-16, E48, E-19, E-20, E-23, E-24, E-30, 
E-36, E-62, E-76, E-77 and E-222 an orange vapor (possibly free burning 
hydrogen was noted rising toward the vertical stabilizer just prior to SSME 
ignition. This vapor has been noted on previous missions. It is not 
considered an issue and no follow-up action is planned. 
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3. Several white flashes were seen in the SSME #1, #2, and #3 plumes after 
SSME ignition on cameras E-3, E-5, E-52, E-57, and E-76. These have been 
seen on previous missions and no follow-up action is planned. 
4. On cameras E-52, E-54, and E-79 a tumbling piece of debris (light/dark) was 
seen near the underside of the Orbiter at mid-fuselage falling aft during 
liftoff. Review by JSC, KSC and Rockwell concluded that it was a piece of ice 
from the L02 feedline. No follow-up action is required. 
5. On cameras E-5, E-6, and E-25a white piece of rectangular debris was seen 
failing from above the L02 ET/ORB umbilical and past the right inboard 
elevon at liftoff: This debris is probably ice from the L02 feedline on the ET 
and is not considered an issue. 
6. Several orange flares were noted in the SSME plumes after the roll 
maneuver and prior to the SRB plume brightening. These observations have 
been seen on previous missions and are understood to be burning of 
propellant impurities. This event was noted on cameras TV-5, ET-212, 
E-204, E-205, E-208, E-212, E-218, and E-220 and is not considered an issue. 
7.. Several typical events reported on other launches were observed on STS-49. 
These events are not a concern, but are documented here for information 
only: 
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area. 
• Debris (Pad, insta-foam, Water trough) in the holddown post areas and 
MLP 
• Butcher paper falling from the RCS 
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV 
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME start-up. 
• Throat plug material which was ejected from the SRB flame duct north 
of the vehicle at liftoff; 
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure (Max-Q) 
region which appeared to have an amplitude and frequency similar to 
those of previous missions. 
• Condensation vapor trails off both wings after the vehicle cleared the 
tower. 
• Charring of ET aft dome. 
• SRB plume brightening, prior to SRB separation. - 
• Linear optical distortions, possibly caused by shock waves or ambient 
meteorolgical conditions near the vehicle, after the roll maneuver. 
• Holddown post shoe rotation during liftoff which was observed to be 
•	 similar to that seen on previous missions. 
8. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. DV08P.010 
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verity that the initial ascent 
clearance separation between the left SEB outer mold line and the failing ET 
vent umbilical structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety. 
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A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances 
between the left SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films 
showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies 
were observed for the SRB body trajectory. 
9. Cameras E7-16 and E27-28 - OMBSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. 
DV08P.20 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to 
verify nozzle to hoiddown post drift clearance. 
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been coxpleted. No 
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive 
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the hoiddown posts were verified. 
10. The landing of STS-49 occurred on runway 22 at Edwards Airforce Base. 
Good video and film coverage of the first use of the new drag chute deploy 
was obtained. The drag parachute system performed as expected. All 
sequenced events occurred as planned and no hardware anomalies were 
observed. 
Analysis continues in the areas of compartment door trajectory, reefed main 
chute operation, and riser position relative to the Orbiter stinger. The 
results of this analysis will be used to validate models against actual flight 
data, and to allow accurate predictions for future flights. 
This letter is of particular interest to Mr. W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and 
Mr. R. W. Hautamald (WE3) at JSC. The Integration Contractor contacts are 
R. Ramon at (310) 922-3679 or C. I. Miyashiro at (310) 922-0214. 
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